基於有限預算標價式拍賣之異質性頻譜分配方法

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賴文祥(Wen-hsiang Lai) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

通訊工程學系

論文名稱

基於有限預算標價式拍賣之異質性頻譜分配方法
(A Posted-price Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing under Budget Constraints)

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摘要(中)

隨著無線網路技術拓展與產品的普及，導致頻譜資源的需求與日俱增，使得無線頻譜資源逐漸匱乏，因此有效地提升頻段資源的使用率是通訊中重要的一項議題。無線感知網路為近年來所發展的新型通訊模式，目的是提高頻譜的使用率，故研究高效率的頻譜分配機制是有其必要性。

在本文中，我們設計一個無線感知網路系統模型，其組成為一個頻譜擁有者 (PO)、多個主要使用者 (PU) 和多個次要使用者 (SU)。我們設計了一個拍賣模式的頻段分配，其中 SU 作為競標者來競標頻段，而 PO 作為拍賣者拍賣空白頻段以獲得利潤。

隨著目前技術的發展，應著重於更符合實際情況的異質性頻段。我們實現一個拍賣模式的頻譜拍賣模式。根據次要使用者們的預算與其估值，決定相對應的物品的價格以符合經濟屬性與預算及數量限制條件。本篇提出線性規劃與公布價格式機制來進行有效率的頻譜分配，在文中會加以詳述。最後的數值模擬將討論SU之效能函數、PO的收益函數和整體社會福利函數於不同預算限制、異質性與同質性與其他參考文獻所提出的方法進行分析。

摘要(英)

Cognitive radio is a well-known communication paradigm that can significantly improve spectrum utilization by allowing the cognitive radio users (unlicensed users) to dynamically utilize the licensed spectrum. Studying efficient spectrum allocation mechanism is urgent due to this situation. In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network consisting of a primary spectrum owner (PO), multiple primary users (PU) and multiple secondary users (SU). We propose a sequential posted-price auction mechanism (SPA) for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks where the SUs bid to buy spectrum bands from the PO who acts as the auctioneer, selling idle spectrum bands to make a profit and consider a more general and more realistic case where channels have different qualities. Also, SUs are allowed to express their preferences for each channel separately. That is, each SU submits a vector of bids, one for each channel and purchase the spectrum bands under their own budgets. This mechanism will proceed by the Linear Programming Relaxation (LPR) to achieve the high efficiency of the spectrum allocation which involves the economic properties and the budget limit. Finally, we will show some results to show what performance in terms of utility, revenue and social welfare between our work and the previous.

關鍵字(中)

★ 預算限制
★ 無線感知網路
★ 異質性頻段

關鍵字(英)

★ Budget Constraint
★ Cognitive Radio Networks
★ Heterogeneous Subchannel

論文目次

目錄
頁次
謝誌....................................................... k
中文摘要................................................... i
英文摘要................................................... iii
目錄....................................................... v
圖目錄..................................................... vi
表目錄..................................................... viii

一、序論................................................ 1
1.1 前言................................................. 1
1.2 研究動機............................................. 2
1.3 論文架構............................................. 3

二、相關背景研究........................................ 4
2.1 感知無線網路......................................... 4
2.2 頻譜貿易............................................. 7
2.3 賽局理論............................................. 8
2.4 拍賣理論............................................. 11
2.5 異質性的頻段......................................... 15
2.6 預算限制............................................. 18

三、系統架構............................................ 20
3.1 系統模型描述......................................... 20
3.2 拍賣理論模型......................................... 21
3.3 估值................................................. 23
3.4 效能函數............................................. 25

四、異質性頻譜頻段分配.................................. 27
4.1 參數定義與表示....................................... 27
4.2 線性規劃關係......................................... 30
4.3 標價式機制........................................... 34
4.4 近似算法............................................. 38

五、數值模擬及分析...................................... 40
5.1 模擬參數設定......................................... 40
5.2 標價式機制自身效能比較............................... 41
5.3 異質性頻譜與同質性頻譜比較........................... 43
5.3.1 考慮預算設定下的異質性頻譜與同質性頻譜比較....... 46
5.4 本篇與其他異質性頻譜分配方法比較..................... 49

六、結論................................................ 54

參考文獻................................................... 57

參考文獻

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[2] Mitola III, Joseph, and Gerald Q. Maguire Jr. "Cognitive radio: making software radios more personal." Personal Communications, IEEE 6.4 (1999): 13-18.
[3] 周建銘第"技術專欄-感知無線網路", 工研院資通所
[4] Chen, Kwang‐Cheng, and Ramjee Prasad. "Spectrum Management of Cognitive Radio Networks." Cognitive Radio Networks (2009): 335-355.
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[6] Gao, Lin, et al. "Spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks: A contract-theoretic modeling approach." Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on 29.4 (2011): 843-855.
[7] Wang, Beibei, Yongle Wu, and KJ Ray Liu. "Game theory for cognitive radio networks: An overview." Computer networks 54.14 (2010): 2537-2561.
[8] Niyato, Dusit, and Ekram Hossain. "Competitive spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: a dynamic game approach." Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on 7.7 (2008): 2651-2660.
[9] Niyato, Dusit, and Ekram Hossain. "Competitive pricing for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: Dynamic game, inefficiency of nash equilibrium, and collusion." Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on 26.1 (2008): 192-202.
[10] Huang, Jianwei, Randall A. Berry, and Michael L. Honig. "Auction-based spectrum sharing." Mobile Networks and Applications 11.3 (2006): 405-418.
[11] Myerson, Roger B. "Optimal auction design." Mathematics of operations research 6.1 (1981): 58-73.
[12] Ma, Miao, and Danny HK Tsang. "Impact of channel heterogeneity on spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks." Communications, 2008. ICC′08. IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2008.
[13] Khaledi, Mojgan, and Alhussein Abouzeid. "Auction-based spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks with heterogeneous channels." Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA), 2013. IEEE, 2013.
[14] Bhattacharya, Sayan, et al. "Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items." Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing. ACM, 2010.
[15] Dong, Mo, et al. "Combinatorial auction with time-frequency flexibility in cognitive radio networks." INFOCOM, 2012 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2012.
[16] Anwar, Sajid, and Mingli Zheng. "Posted price selling and online auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 90 (2015): 81-92.
[17] Sandhya, E., and C. B. Prasanth. "Marshall-Olkin Discrete Uniform Distribution." Journal of Probability 2014 (2014).
[18] Lin, How-min. "Heterogeneous Subchannel Sharing with Budget Constraint in Cognitive Radio Networks." (2013).
[19] Yang, Lei, et al. "Pricing-based decentralized spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks." IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) 21.2 (2013): 522-535.

指導教授

黃志煒(Chih-wei Huang)

審核日期

2015-8-17

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