博碩士論文 103426024 詳細資訊




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姓名 王筱菱(Xiao-Ling Wang)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 工業管理研究所
論文名稱
(Coordination in the Consumer Return Policy Environment)
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摘要(中) 隨著產品種類的增加與消費者意識抬頭,消費者的退貨政策現今無處不在,許多消費者已經習慣將不想要的商品退回給店家其中並不需要任何理由。所以考慮消費者退貨政策之下的供應鏈協調機制也逐漸受到重視。而供應鏈通路協調的議題已經在許多論文中被廣泛的探討以及應用,其目的為達成整體供應鏈的利潤最大化,使得供應商與零售商雙方的利潤都會比沒有進行通路協調時來的大。
本文使用BuyBack合約與Revenue and Risk Sharing合約來達成供應鏈的通路協調。不同於傳統的合約,在消費者退貨政策中,BuyBack合約我們考慮退還品項成本及殘值;而Revenue and Risk Sharing合約與一般營收分享合約不一樣的部份在於我們考慮供應商一起共同承擔零售商之風險。在研究中,我們假設供應商及零售商各一位,在零售商推出顧客退貨政策的情況下,藉由供應鏈中不同的協調機制來探討供應商與零售商分別在不合作以及合作下的利潤。由結果可以觀察到,如果供應商與零售商不單只考慮自身利益,而是透過通路協調機制來合作,則可以使得整體供應鏈的利潤最大化以及達到增加彼此利潤的目的,達成雙贏局勢。
摘要(英) With the increase of product variety, consumer returns policies are ubiquitous today. Many consumers have grown accustomed to being able to bring unwanted merchandise back to the store for just about any reason.
Consumer returns policies help to stimulate demand by protecting consumers against the possibility of product misfit. However, consumer returns policies may incur excess inventories and handling costs for firms when items are returned. What are the implications of returns policies on supply chain management? How does the refund influence the coordination mechanism and profitability of retailer and supplier? This paper aims to address these issues.
In this study, we consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The original newsvendor contract can be found easily in the history literature review. However, our research focuses on dealing with the problem causing from retailer, who offers partial returns to consumers when the product does not fit their individual needs or tastes. It means consumer can obtain partial refund of the product when he/she return the product to the retailer. With a push contract, the supplier is the leader and the retailer is the follower. The supplier knows the retailer’s reaction and the retailer orders the quantity base on the wholesale price before the selling season. Because of consumer returns policies, the retailer bears most of the inventory risk, that will not coordinate the supply chain. Hence, we use coordination mechanism (the buyback contract, the revenue and risk sharing contract) to coordinate the supply chain.
關鍵字(中) ★ 協調機制
★ 顧客退貨政策
★ 報童問題
關鍵字(英) ★ Coordination Mechanism
★ Consumer Return Policy
★ Newsvendor Problem
論文目次 中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
Contents iii
Contents of Tables iv
Contents of Figures v
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1-1 Motivation 1
1-2 Research Objective 2
Chapter 2 Literature Review 5
2-1 Newsvendor Problem 5
2-2 Coordination Mechanism 6
2-3 Returns Policies 7
Chapter 3 Model and Analysis 11
3-1 Environment Statement 11
3-2 Retailer’s Behavior and Decision 17
3-3 Supplier’s Behavior and Decision 18
3-4 Coordination Mechanism 19
3-4-1 The Buyback Contract 19
3-4-2 The Revenue and Risk Sharing Contract 21
Chapter 4 Numerical Example 23
4-1 The Centralized Coordinate System 23
4-2 The Wholesale Price Contract 24
4-3 The Buyback Contract 25
4-4 The Revenue and Risk Sharing Contract 26
Chapter 5 Sensitivity Analysis 28
Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Research 36
6-1 Conclusion 36
6-2 Future Research 38
References 39
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指導教授 曾富祥 審核日期 2016-7-14
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