建立非對稱交叉價格敏感度之替代品與 對稱互補性之互補品重新探討RCM 和CC

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姓名

曾云(Yun Tseng) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

工業管理研究所

論文名稱

建立非對稱交叉價格敏感度之替代品與對稱互補性之互補品重新探討RCM 和CC
(Re-investigating RCM and Category Captainship for substitute products under non-symmetric cross-price sensitivity and complementary products under the symmetric complementarity)

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摘要(中)

本研究採用Singh and Vives (1984)的效用函數推導出非對稱交叉價格敏感度之替代品需求函數，以此非對稱的替代品需求函數重新探討兩種品類管理, Retail Category Management(RCM) 和Category Captainship (CC) 情境下的管理議題。我們提出相關的議題包含了在兩種品類之下, 零售商如何配置品類的貨架空間、最佳批發價的制定、零售商或category captain該如何為兩替代品制定零售價等。最後，本研究以數值分析說明在不同的貨架空間成本、兩替代品的非對稱交叉價格敏感度和不同的聯盟利潤分配等情境下，零售商、Category Captain和Non-captain製造商應該選擇RCM或CC品類管理對其較有利的管理意涵。
Singh and Vives (1984)的效用函數可以解釋兩產品之間不同的替代程度與互補程度，亦能夠達成本研究目的。故本研究藉由Singh and Vives (1984)的效用函數建立對稱互補性之互補品需求函數，並使用Category Captain管理方式探討兩個互補性品類的問題，命名為“Complementary Category Captainship”，簡稱CCC。本研究模型化品類管理CCC的機制將延用 Kurtulus and Toktay (2011)的作法。
最後，本研究提出互補品的數值分析，說明在不同的貨架空間成本、兩互補品的對稱互補性、不同的聯盟利潤分配等情境下，零售商、Category Captain和Non-captain製造商應該選擇RCM或CCC對其較有利的管理意涵。

摘要(英)

In this research, we will model a non-symmetric cross-price sensitivity demand function derived from the utility function (Singh and Vives, 1984). And we use this non-symmetric demand function to re-investigating the relative management issues including the retailer category shelf space allocation, the optimal wholesale price set by manufacturers, and retail prices set by the retailer or Category captain in RCM and CC scenario. Finally, we proposed a numerical analysis to explain the different situations including the different opportunity cost of shelf space, different product cross-price sensitivity, different profit sharing of CC alliance, etc. And we will provide management implications for the retailer, category captain and non-captain manufacturer in different cases of RCM and CC.
The utility function from Singh and Vives (1984) can explain the degree of substitution and complementarity between products, it can achieve the purpose of this research. Hence, we adopted the utility function of Singh and Vives (1984) to construct the complementary product demand function under the symmetric complementarity, and we study two complementary categories by using Category Captain management, named as “Complementary Category Captainship” (CCC). We will extend the CC mechanism from Kurtulus and Toktay (2011) to construct a CCC scenario.

關鍵字(中)

★ 零售商品類管理
★ 品類統帥
★ 非對稱交叉價格敏感度
★ 對稱互補性
★ 互補品品類管理

關鍵字(英)

★ category management
★ Category Captainship
★ RCM
★ non-symmetric cross-price sensitivity
★ the symmetric complementarity

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝 iii
Contents iv
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
1.1 Research background and motivation 1
1.1.1 Substitute products under non-symmetric cross-price sensitivity in RCM and CC scenarios 4
1.1.2 Complementary products under the symmetric complementarity in “Complementary Category Captainship” (CCC) 6
1.2 Research objectives 9
1.3 Research Methodology 12
Chapter2. Literature review 14
2.1 Researches for Utility Function and Demand Function problems 14
2.2 Researches for category captainship 17
Chapter3. Substitute products demand function in RCM and CC 19
3.1 The Model - Non-Symmetric Demand Functions of Substitute products 19
3.2 Propositions- Substitute products under non-symmetric cross-price sensitivity 22
Chapter 4. Complementary products demand function in CCC 32
4.1 The Model - Symmetric Demand Functions of Complementary products 32
4.2 Propositions- Complementary products under the Symmetric complementarity. 33
Chapter 5. Numerical Analysis for Substitute products 37
5.1 Numerical Analysis 38
5.2 Remark 43
Chapter 6. Numerical Analysis for Complementary products 49
6.1 Numerical Analysis 50
6.2 Remark 53
Chapter 7. Conclusions 56
References 58
Appendix A 60
Appendix B.1 61
Appendix B.2 (Wholesale Price Game in RCM) 64
Appendix B.3. Proof of Proposition 1 68
Appendix C.2 (Second Manufacturer’s Wholesale Price in CC) 73
Appendix C.3. Proof of Proposition 2 75
Appendix D 82
Appendix E: Numerical analysis of substitutes and complementary products 91
Appendix F: The auxiliary expressions for the equations shown in the Propositions 92

參考文獻

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指導教授

沈國基

審核日期

2017-7-26

推文