企業社會責任與政治獻金之關聯

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包世瑛(Shih-Ying Pao) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

企業社會責任與政治獻金之關聯

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摘要(中)

本研究主要探討負面企業社會責任的企業是否會投注較多資金以建立政商關係，當企業違反企業社會責任事件較多時，是否會將資金投資在政治捐獻上，藉由政治影響力減輕負面形象造成的傷害。本研究利用臺灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ)中上市櫃企業財務數據與MSCI資料庫中ESG評分資訊，以及2005年至2020年立委選舉之政治獻金資料，來檢視企業社會責任與政治獻金之間的關聯性。實證結果顯示，企業社會責任裁罰金額較多的企業，捐贈政治獻金給立委的意願較高，且不同產業違反企業社會責任的構面有所不同；從社會責任表現(ESG分數)來衡量，社會責任表現較好的企業，其捐贈政治獻金的意願較低。另外本研究檢測家族企業的調節效果，研究結果顯示家族企業對裁罰金額與政治獻金之關係具正向調節效果，然而家族企業對社會責任表現與政治獻金關係之負向調節效果不顯著。

摘要(英)

This study mainly explores whether companies with negative corporate social responsibility establish a political-business relationship. Because corporate social responsibility can be regarded as a long-term intangible asset, and political contributions are short-term intangible assets, when there are many incidents of corporate social responsibility violations, whether to use funds Invest in contributions to the political figures. This study uses the financial data of listed companies in the Taiwan Economic News Database (TEJ) and the ESG score information in the MSCI database, as well as the data of political contributions from the legislative elections from 2005 to 2020, to corporate social responsibility and political contributions explore.
The results demonstrate that companies with a large amount of corporate social responsibility fines are more likely to donate political contributions to legislators, and different industries have different aspects of violating corporate social responsibility. However, companies with higher ESG scores are less willing to donate political contributions. In addition, this study tests whether family businesses are more likely to donate political contributions. The results show that when these businesses have more social responsibility penalties, they tend to establish political connections by donating political contributions. However, the higher ESG score of family companies, it may not be more willing to make political donations.

關鍵字(中)

★ 政商關係
★ 政治獻金
★ 企業社會責任
★ ESG

關鍵字(英)

★ Political-business relationship
★ political contributions
★ corporate social responsibility
★ ESG

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
一、緒論 1
1-1研究背景與動機 1
1-2研究目的與問題 2
1-3研究架構 3
二、文獻探討 4
2-1-1政商關係 4
2-1-2政治捐獻 6
2-1-3 臺灣政治獻金規範 6
2-2-1企業社會責任（Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR） 9
2-2-2 ESG 11
2-3研究假說建立 12
三、研究方法 14
3-1 資料來源和選樣方法 14
3-2 實證模型 14
3-2-1企業裁罰金額與企業捐贈政治獻金之關係 14
3-2-2 ESG總分數與企業捐贈政治獻金之關係 16
3-2-3 家族企業裁罰金額與企業捐贈政治獻金之關係 17
3-2-4 家族企業ESG總分數與企業捐贈政治獻金之關係 18
3-3變數衡量 19
3-3-1應變數 19
3-3-2自變數 20
3-3-3其他控制變數 25
四、實證結果 28
4-1樣本產業捐贈及違法情形 28
4-2假說一實證結果 30
4-3假說二實證結果 40
4-4假說三實證結果 46
4-5假說四實證結果 50
4-6敏感性分析 55
五、結論與建議 68
5-1研究結論與貢獻 68
5-2研究限制與建議 69
參考文獻 70

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指導教授

黃承祖

審核日期

2021-8-4

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