國防R&D 與經濟成長： 同盟國與敵對國之分析

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吳佳穎(Chia-Ying Wu) 查詢紙本館藏

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經濟學系

論文名稱

國防R&D 與經濟成長：同盟國與敵對國之分析

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摘要(中)

國防科技的研究發展與創新一直是國防經濟的基礎議題。在這次的研究中，我們企圖分析在具開放經濟特質的國防Schumpeterian 成長模型下，國防 R&D、模仿率與專利權如何影響均衡的勞動配置與社會福利。我們發現本國國防 R&D 提高時會降低民間 R&D 部門與生產差異性部門的高技術勞勞工比例。當兩國為同盟國關係時:國家各自發展的最適國防支出會低於聯合發展的最適國防支出;模仿率帶來的效益不管是聯合發展或各自發展，對社會福利都具有正向效應;國家聯合發展的最適專利權是否大於各自發展的最適專利權，取決於本國國防科技水準保衛程度與民間 R&D 排擠程度的相對大小。當兩國為敵對國時:國家各自發展的最適國防支出會高於聯合發展的最適國防支出;國家在各自發展時，模仿率對社會福利有負向影響，而在聯合發展時，模仿率對社會福利有不確定的影響效果;國家各自發展的最適專利權會大於聯合發展的最適專利權。

摘要(英)

The defense research and development (R&D) has been a fundamental issue in defense economics. In this paper, we attempt to develop a two-country defense Schumpeterian growth model and then explore how defense R&D, the imitation rate and patent policy affect the domestic and foreign equilibrium labor allocation and social welfare. We find some interesting results. When two countries are in an alliance relationship, (a) the Nash-equilibrium defense expenditure that is unilaterally chosen by each government is lower than the optimal defense expenditure chosen by cooperative government; (b) the imitation rate has a positive effect on social welfare regardless the Nash-equilibrium or the Global-equilibrium; (c) the optimal patent policy chosen by cooperative government is larger than the Nash-equilibrium patent policy that is unilaterally chosen by each government if the degree of defense R&D is larger than the degree of crowding- out on civilian R&D. When two countries are hostile to each other, (a) the Nash- equilibrium defense expenditure that is unilaterally chosen by each government is larger than the optimal defense expenditure chosen by cooperative government; (b) the imitation rate has a negative effect on social welfare under the Nash-equilibrium whereas the imitation rate has an ambiguous effect on social welfare under the Global- equilibrium; (c) the optimal patent policy chosen by cooperative government is lower than the Nash-equilibrium patent policy that is unilaterally chosen by each government.

關鍵字(中)

★ 國防 R&D
★ 專利權
★ 模仿率
★ 軍備競合

關鍵字(英)

★ defense R&D
★ patent policy
★ the imitation rate
★ armaments race

論文目次

目錄
摘要 .............................................................. i
Abstract ......................................................... ii
致謝 ............................................................ iii
目錄 ............................................................. iv
第一章緒論 ....................................................... 1
1.1 研究背景.......................................................... 1
1.2 研究動機.......................................................... 1
1.3 研究方法.......................................................... 3
第二章文獻回顧 ................................................... 4
第三章模型設定 ................................................... 8
3.1 家計單位的最適決策 ............................................. 8
3.2 廠商的最適決策 ................................................ 10
3.3 國防 R&D (政府) ................................................ 14
3.4 資源限制式 .................................................... 15
3.5 總體經濟均衡 .................................................. 15
3.6 總合經濟 ...................................................... 17
3.7 靜止均衡的勞動配置 ............................................ 19
第四章福利分析 .................................................. 21
第五章結論 ...................................................... 28
參考文獻 ......................................................... 29
附錄 ............................................................. 32

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指導教授

廖志興(Chih-Hsing Liao)

審核日期

2023-7-14

推文