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我國雙重代表訴訟制度現代化之探究—公司法與證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法之交錯;Toward the Institutionalization of Double Derivative Suits in Taiwan: At the Intersection of the Company Act and the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act

Tue, 20 Oct 2026 08:20:17 GMT

title: 我國雙重代表訴訟制度現代化之探究—公司法與證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法之交錯;Toward the Institutionalization of Double Derivative Suits in Taiwan: At the Intersection of the Company Act and the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act abstract: 本研究旨在探討企業集團化經營下，因公司法人格獨立及組織層級化所造成之控制公司股東監督與救濟缺口。隨企業組織由單一公司發展為複雜之控制從屬關係，責任追究可能因公司層級阻隔而受限，致控制公司股東雖間接受有不利益，卻欠缺跨越公司層級之救濟途徑。本文透過法理分析、司法實務檢討及美國法比較，提出我國雙重代表訴訟之規範基礎、制度要件及法制定位。研究發現，我國實務雖逐漸區分股東直接損害與公司間接損害，並要求股東循代表訴訟途徑尋求救濟，惟現行法尚無雙重代表訴訟之明文依據，部分裁判遂透過特定身分連結處理原告適格，可能使責任追究對象及制度適用範圍受到限制。針對上述困境，本文主張，雙重代表訴訟不應限於全資從屬公司，而應以公司法第369條之2所定控制從屬關係為基礎；起訴股東僅須具備控制公司股東身分，前置程序亦應以向控制公司之有權機關提出請求為已足。制度定位上，長期宜於公司法建立一般性制度，短期則可先修正投保法，明文賦予投保中心提起雙重代表訴訟之權限，以充實我國集團公司治理之監督機制。;This study examines gaps in shareholder oversight and remedies caused by the separate legal personality and multilayered structure of corporate groups. As organizations develop into controlling–subordinate relationships， shareholders of a controlling company may suffer indirect harm from injury to a subordinate company yet remain unable to pursue relief across corporate boundaries. Through doctrinal analysis， review of judicial practice， and comparison with U.S. law， this study explores the foundations， requirements， and institutional framework of double derivative suits in Taiwan. The study finds that Taiwanese courts have increasingly distinguished direct shareholder harm from indirect corporate harm and required shareholders to seek relief through derivative siuts. However， because current law does not expressly recognize double derivative suits， some courts have relied on identity-based connections to establish standing， thereby limiting liability and available relief. This study argues that double derivative suits should be based on the controlling subordinate relationship under Article 369-2 of the Company Act rather than limited to wholly owned subordinate companies. A plaintiff should only be required to hold shares in the controlling company， and a pre-suit demand to its competent organ should suffice. Ultimately， a general regime should be established under the Company Act， while the Investor Protection Act may serve as an interim framework.

我國法人故意犯罪之構成要件建構——以美國代位責任模式為借鏡;我國法人故意犯罪之構成要件建構——以美國代位責任模式為借鏡

Tue, 20 Oct 2026 08:19:49 GMT

title: 我國法人故意犯罪之構成要件建構——以美國代位責任模式為借鏡;我國法人故意犯罪之構成要件建構——以美國代位責任模式為借鏡 abstract: 現代法人透過組織分工、決策與管理參與經濟活動，其犯罪風險往往並非個別成員之偶發違法，而與法人之組織政策、監督機制及企業文化密切相關。然而，我國刑法典尚未就法人刑事責任設有一般性規定，相關處罰散見於附屬刑法，致法人受罰之歸責基礎與構成要件仍欠明確。本文以法人故意犯罪之構成要件建構為核心，整理我國相關理論、現行規範及實務案例，並考察美國代位責任模式。該模式以受僱人或代理人於職權範圍內、為法人利益所為之犯罪歸責於法人，具有歸責要件明確及犯罪預防之優點，但亦可能造成自然人責任之轉嫁與法人責任之過度擴張。本文主張，我國應吸收美國法上職權範圍與法人利益之要素，並以組織體責任模式加以實質化。客觀上，應以自然人成員於法人業務活動中實施犯罪為連結，並要求該行為可評價為法人之組織行為，且與法人利益或營運目的具有實質關聯；主觀上，則須由法人之政策、決策、管理方針或企業文化，認定其對違法風險具有認識、追求、容認或放任之組織故意。如此，法人刑事責任方能建立於其自身之組織不法，並兼顧企業犯罪防制、罪責原則與自己責任原則。;Modern corporations operate through complex systems of decision-making， management， and division of labor. Corporate crime may therefore reflect not only individual misconduct but also corporate policies， supervision， and culture. However， Taiwan’s Criminal Code contains no general rules on corporate criminal liability， while relevant provisions remain scattered across subsidiary criminal statutes. This thesis examines the constituent elements of intentional corporate crime by reviewing Taiwanese law and practice and comparing them with the U.S. vicarious liability model. Under the U.S. model， a corporation may be liable for crimes committed by employees or agents within the scope of their authority and for the corporation’s benefit. Although this approach promotes crime prevention， it may also overextend corporate liability. This thesis argues that Taiwan should adopt the elements of scope of authority and corporate benefit while supplementing them with the organizational liability model. Objectively， the offense must be attributable to the corporation as an organizational act and substantially related to its business or interests. Subjectively， organizational intent should be inferred from corporate policies， decision-making， management， or culture. This approach grounds corporate criminal liability in the corporation’s own organizational wrongdoing and better accords with the principles of culpability and personal responsibility.

論保險業務員續期服務獎金之約定對於從屬性認定之影響;The Impact of Renewal Service Bonus Agreements on the Determination of Employee Subordination for Insurance Sales Agents

Tue, 20 Oct 2026 08:19:29 GMT

title: 論保險業務員續期服務獎金之約定對於從屬性認定之影響;The Impact of Renewal Service Bonus Agreements on the Determination of Employee Subordination for Insurance Sales Agents abstract: 勞動契約以從屬性為要件，而實務上從屬性又以人格從屬性、經濟上從屬性、組織上從屬性為其內涵，而有續期服務獎金約定之勞務契約是否必然得出具有從屬性之結論，本文整理後，傾向得出肯定之結論，其原因有三：其一，就續期服務獎金制度而言，續期服務獎金是在保險商品製作時，即已整體考量商品成本與獲利結構，而經保險精算計算得出，以此觀之，保險公司與業務員之間之關係似乎可以單純為，於保險商品招攬於工作完成領取特定給付報酬之承攬關係。續期服務獎金領取總額已經保險精算而無法由後續保險公司再為更動確為屬實。然此忽略保險實務上保險公司對此類獎金領取多設有諸多條件與限制，例如通過考核、達成一定業績，領取數額也會因是否為主管業務員與其主管階級而有所差異，凡此種種皆為保險公司，藉由調控佣金獲取比率以有效管理旗下業務員所設計之佣金制度。其次，再續期服務獎金領取要件上，現行實務多以繼續服務為其要件。而本文比較其他類型勞務契約發現，不因有「繼續服務」之要件，而必然被定型為特定典型契約，真正影響契約定性者為勞務提供過程中雇主的干預程度。而實務上此類獎金約定通常會以承攬契約形式約定，然實務上多有聯立締結一僱傭契約，而就繼續提供服務之內容與獎金領取方式藉由僱傭契約約定藉此規避勞動契約之認定。因此本文認為在此類情況縱為聯立契約，於契約定性上仍因參酌另一獨立之僱傭契約所提供之勞務內容一併觀察。而觀察實務後發現實務就獎金報酬之領取，多設有如下規定：通過雇主業績考量、是否達成一定業績標準、是否通過雇主所訂之教育訓練等，形式上雖然與勞務提供過程沒有直接關係，但雇主對此的限制將迫使業務員不得不聽從雇主指令，包括接受雇主人力調派、從事與保險招攬無關之行政事務與組織內部活動，因而具備人格從屬性。其三，就保險業務員管理規則而言，該管理規則課予保險公司一公法上義務，避免業務員為求保險招攬而有害交易秩序與要保人權益，為達成此一管制目的，要求保險公司舉辦教育訓練、要求訂立獎懲辦法等，形成保險公司對保險業務員之嚴密控制，因此該管理規則落實於保險公司與其下業務員之間，無可避免的結果就是加強渠間從屬關係。而在結論而言，本文之所以對答案僅謂傾向肯定，而非必然，其原因也正如前述三者，就續期服務獎金之制度與要件而言，若保險公司不設立太多與保險招攬無關的領取條件，使報酬領取可以完全繫諸於保險招攬成果，那業務員就不易受雇主保險公司指示干預。就管理規則而言，實務之所以將管理規則採為為渠間勞動契約之認定，原因在於勞動契約與勞務契約之界線在規範上沒有明確分立，根本解決之法應係以專法方式，明確針對不同勞動契約要件、類型、當事人間權利義務關係與當事人間應負有何種公法上義務為詳細之規範，如此才不致發生，將公法上義務，採為私人間權利義務關係認定之模糊空間。;A labor contract is defined by the existence of subordination. In practice， subordination is generally understood to encompass personal subordination， economic subordination， and organizational subordination. The question then arises: does a service contract that includes a provision for renewal service commissions necessarily entail subordination? This study suggests that the answer tends toward the affirmative， for three reasons: First， from the perspective of the renewal service commission system， such commissions are determined at the stage of insurance product design. At that point， the overall cost structure and profit model of the product are taken into account， and the commission is calculated actuarially. From this perspective， the relationship between the insurance company and the agent may appear to be a pure contract for work， in which remuneration is paid upon completion of the task of soliciting insurance policies. It is true that the total amount of renewal service commissions is actuarially determined and cannot be altered thereafter by the insurer. However， this overlooks the reality that， in practice， insurance companies often impose numerous conditions and restrictions on the receipt of such commissions， such as passing performance evaluations， achieving certain sales targets， and variations in commission amounts depending on whether the agent holds a supervisory position and at what managerial level. These mechanisms demonstrate that insurers effectively manage their agents by adjusting commission allocation ratios. Second， with respect to the requirements for receiving renewal-service bonuses， current practice generally requires continued service. However， comparison with other types of service contracts shows that the existence of a “continuing service” requirement does not necessarily determine a contract as a specific nominate contract. The decisive factor in contract classification is the degree of employer interference in the provision of labor. In practice， such bonus arrangements are often formally structured as contracts for services (independent contracting)， yet are frequently concluded alongside a separate employment contract. Matters concerning continued service and bonus payment methods are regulated through the employment contract， thereby circumventing recognition as an employment relationship. Therefore， this article argues that even in cases of combined contracts， contractual classification should still consider the content of labor provided under the separate employment contract as a whole. Third， with respect to the Regulations Governing Insurance Agents， these rules impose public law obligations on insurance companies to prevent agents from engaging in solicitation practices that could harm market order or policyholder interests. To achieve this regulatory objective， insurers are required to provide training programs and establish systems of rewards and disciplinary measures， thereby creating a framework of close supervision over agents. When these regulations are implemented within the relationship between insurers and their agents， the inevitable result is a strengthening of the subordinate relationship between them. In conclusion， this study adopts a position that is inclined toward， but does not assert， a necessary finding of subordination. The reason lies precisely in the three aspects discussed above. With respect to the system and conditions of renewal service commissions， if insurers refrain from imposing excessive conditions unrelated to insurance solicitation and instead link remuneration primarily to the results of solicitation， agents would be less subject to employer direction and control. As for the regulatory framework， the reason courts tend to rely on these regulations in determining the existence of a labor contract is that the boundary between labor contracts and other service contracts is not clearly delineated in the current legal framework. A more fundamental solution would be to enact a specialized statute that clearly defines the elements， types， rights and obligations， and corresponding public law duties associated with different forms of labor contracts. Only through such clarification can the current ambiguity—where public law obligations are used as a basis for determining private law relationships—be effectively resolved.

動態證券交易模型下的政府資訊揭露時機與市場穩定性;Government Disclosure Timing and Market Stabilization in a Dynamic Trading Model

Tue, 20 Oct 2026 08:19:01 GMT

title: 動態證券交易模型下的政府資訊揭露時機與市場穩定性;Government Disclosure Timing and Market Stabilization in a Dynamic Trading Model abstract: 本文建立一個兩期Kyle 模型，分析政府資訊揭露的時間點如何影響市場流動性、價格資訊性、價格穩定性與策略性交易行為。政府在第一期取得私人訊號s1，並在第二期取得另一個私人訊號s2，同時以穩定兩期價格為目標進行策略性交易。本文比較四種揭露制度：完全不揭露、第一期揭露s1、第二期揭露s2，以及依序完全揭露兩個訊號。研究得到三項主要結果。第一，政府交易可透過降低訂單流的價格衝擊改善市場流動性。然而，當政府更加重視價格穩定時，其抵銷價格變動的交易可能減緩基本面資訊反映於價格的速度。因此，市場流動性的改善可能伴隨價格資訊性的下降。在完全不揭露的制度下，當政府訊號足夠精確且政府具有較強的價格穩定動機時，內部人也可能因應政府介入而採取反向交易策略。第二，早期揭露s1 可使政府資訊更早反映於價格，進而改善價格發現。早期揭露會將部分價格調整提前至第一期，並降低第二期的後續價格修正。同時，早期揭露會使政府訊號成為公共資訊，並削弱政府在後續市場介入中的資訊優勢。第三，晚期揭露s2 的影響主要集中於第二期市場。當訊號成為公共資訊後，造市者會同時根據新揭露的資訊與第二期訂單流更新對資產價值的估計，因此產生一個在訊號維持私有時不會出現的額外第二期價格反應。整體而言，研究結果顯示，政府交易與資訊揭露會共同影響市場品質，而揭露時間點會決定市場流動性、價格發現、價格穩定性與政府資訊優勢的效果如何分配於不同交易期間。;This thesis develops a two-period Kyle model to examine how the timing of government information disclosure affects market liquidity， price informativeness， price stability， and strategic trading behavior. The government receives a private signal， s1， in the first period and an additional private signal， s2， in the second period. It trades strategically with the objective of stabilizing prices in both periods. The analysis compares four disclosure regimes: no disclosure， early disclosure of s1， late disclosure of s2， and sequential full disclosure of both signals. The analysis yields three main findings. First， government trading can improve market liquidity by reducing the price impact of order flow. However， when the government places greater weight on price stabilization， its offsetting trades may slow the incorporation of fundamental information into prices. As a result， improved market liquidity may be accompanied by lower price informativeness. Under no disclosure， sufficiently precise government information and a strong stabilization motive may also induce the insider to adopt a reversed trading strategy. Second， early disclosure of s1 improves price discovery by allowing government in- formation to be incorporated into prices at an earlier stage. It shifts part of the price adjustment to the first period and reduces the subsequent price revision in the second period. At the same time， early disclosure makes the government signal publicly available and weakens the government’s informational advantage in subsequent market intervention. Third， late disclosure of s2 mainly affects the second-period market. Once the signal becomes public， the market maker updates the estimate of the asset value using both the newly disclosed information and second-period order flow. This generates an additional second-period price response that is absent when the signal remains private. Overall， the results show that government trading and information disclosure jointly shape market quality. Disclosure timing determines how the effects on market liquid- ity， price discovery， price stability， and the government’s informational advantage are distributed across trading periods.