Who obtains greater discounts on automobile insurance premiums?

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题名:	Who obtains greater discounts on automobile insurance premiums?
作者:	黃依潔;Chan, Linus F.-S.;Huang, Yi-Chieh;Tzeng, Larry Y.
贡献者:	管理學院企業管理學系
关键词:	Automobile insurance;Bargaining;Discounts;Economics and Finance;Expected utility;Finance;Financial Services;Hypotheses;Insurance;Insurance companies;Insurance coverage;Insurance premiums;International;Liability insurance;Policyholders;Probability;Property damage;Risk aversion;Risk Management;Salvage value;Studies
日期:	2016-03-01
上传时间:	2026-04-23 11:26:48 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.;London: Springer Science + Business Media
摘要:	摘要： Insurance purchasers obtain varied discounts for insurance. This paper examines what drives these differences, specifically whether the loss probability and the wealth of the insured affect the size of the premium discount in automobile insurance. To describe a bargain between a client and an insurer over premiums and coverage, we first develop a sequential insurance bargaining game where the client has an outside option to bargain with another insurer. We find that the equilibrium involves full coverage and, based on the results of comparative statics, we propose hypotheses regarding the effects of the loss probability and the wealth of the insured on the size of the premium discount. We then use a unique data set of 85,806 observations of Taiwanese automobile liability insurance for property damage to empirically test the predictions. After controlling for underwriting and macroeconomic variables, we find that both (1) the insured with a lower claim probability (as a proxy for the insured with a lower loss probability) and (2) the insured with a higher salvage value car (as a proxy for the wealthier insured) receive a greater premium discount. These results support our theoretical results. 其他題名： Geneva Risk Insur Rev 出版者： London: Springer Science + Business Media 出版日期： 2016-03-01 出處： The Geneva risk and insurance review, 2016-03, Vol.41 (1), p.48-72 資源來源： ABI/INFORM Collection 版權： 2016 The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 版權： The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 2016 識別號： ISSN: 1554-964X 識別號： EISSN: 1554-9658 識別號： DOI: 10.1057/grir.2015.4
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