本研究探討在風險不確定性下，策略性投資與資訊揭露如何影響供應鏈中之干擾傳播與決策行為。多數既有供應鏈韌性研究主要在靜態或單期架構下分析韌性投資或資訊揭露相關行為與影響，因此較難捕捉企業策略如何隨時間與系統狀態而演化。此外，Stackelberg賽局模型通常強調階層式互動，但較少處理隨機狀態演化，而馬可夫決策過程（MDP）模型雖著重於不確定性下之動態最佳化，卻多半假設集中式決策。因此，策略互動與多期隨機決策過程之整合研究仍相對有限。 為填補此研究缺口，本研究透過建立Stackelberg-MDP模型，用以分析單鏈供應鏈中上游領導者與下游追隨者之間之互動關係。在此模型中，上下游企業會根據自身所處狀態，依序進行韌性投資與資訊揭露決策，並在受到干擾時採取自我恢復行動。投資行為會影響風險干擾暴露程度與狀態轉移機率，而上游資訊揭露則作為一種訊號傳遞，進一步影響下游企業之反應。本模型透過狀態空間、行動空間、轉移機率、報酬函數與價值迭代演算法，將企業策略行為與供應鏈系統動態連結起來。 本研究所提出之架構能夠系統性分析策略行為如何透過供應鏈上下游之序列互動而演變，評估投資與揭露決策在不同期間下所產生之跨期誘因，並說明供應鏈不同層級之間如何進行相關決策，以及資訊揭露如何影響下游反應、系統穩定性與經濟效應。;This study examines how strategic investment and information disclosure influence disruption propagation and decision-making behavior in a supply chain under risk uncertainty. Most existing research on supply chain resilience analyzes investment or disclosure decisions within static or single-period frameworks， limiting the ability to capture how strategies evolve. Moreover， Stackelberg game models typically emphasize hierarchical interaction but overlook stochastic state evolution， whereas Markov Decision Process (MDP) models focus on dynamic optimization under uncertainty but often assume centralized decision-making. Therefore， the integration of strategic interaction and multi-period stochastic decision processes remains limited. To address this gap， this study develops a Stackelberg-MDP model for a single-chain supply chain with leader-follower interaction between upstream and downstream firms. Firms sequentially decide on resilience investment and information disclosure. Investment actions affect disruption exposure and state transition probabilities， while disclosure transmits signals that influence downstream responses and order-related outcomes. The model links strategic behavior with system dynamics through state spaces， action spaces， transition probabilities， reward functions， and value iteration. The proposed framework enables systematic analysis of how resilience strategies evolve through sequential upstream-downstream interactions. By integrating strategic interaction with the dynamic state， the model evaluates the intertemporal incentives associated with investment and disclosure decisions. The analysis provides managerial insights into how strategies can be coordinated across supply chain tiers and how information disclosure influences downstream responses， system stability， and economic performance.
