本研究探討需求不確定下，產能保留合約結合轉讓機制之決策問題。在高科技產 業、半導體供應鏈及其他資本密集型製造環境中，上游產能建置成本高、擴充期長， 且短期內不易調整；相對地，下游需求高度不確定，因而使供需協調成為重要議題。 產能保留合約使買方可於需求實現前先支付保留費以取得未來使用產能之權利，並於 實際使用時再支付執行費。然而，需求實現後，各買方實際需求與原先保留量可能不 一致，因而導致部分買方產能不足、部分買方持有剩餘產能，形成缺貨與閒置並存之 資源錯置現象。 本文建立單期、單一供應商與兩位買方之產能保留合約模型，比較無轉讓與允許 轉讓兩種制度安排，並進一步探討需求不確定下之契約設計問題。研究首先在資訊對 稱情境下建立基準模型，分析供應商保留價格、轉讓分成比例與買方最適預留量之決 策結果；接著透過敏感度分析，探討需求機率、保留價格、轉讓分成比例與需求差異 等參數變動對買方利潤、供應商利潤與系統總利潤之影響；最後延伸至資訊不對稱情 境，分析供應商面對高、低需求型買方時之契約設計與利潤變化。數值結果顯示，當 買方需求實現出現錯配時，允許轉讓可使未使用產能重新配置至高需求買方，降低產 能閒置與缺貨損失，進而提升供應商利潤與系統總利潤。此外，在資訊不對稱下，供 應商可透過差異化契約設計引導不同需求型買方選擇適合之產能保留決策。整體而 言，本文將產能保留合約、轉讓機制與資訊不對稱整合於同一分析架構中，可作為需 求不確定下供應鏈產能配置與契約設計之決策依據。;In this study， the decision-making problem of capacity reservation contracts combined with a transfer mechanism under demand uncertainty is examined. In high-tech industries， semiconductor supply chains， and other capital-intensive manufacturing environments， upstream capacity requires high investment costs， long expansion lead times， and limited short-term flexibility， while downstream demand is highly uncertain. A capacity reservation contract allows buyers to pay a reservation fee before demand realization to secure future capacity and pay an execution fee when the capacity is used. However， after demand is realized， actual demand may differ from the reserved quantity， causing capacity shortages for some buyers and unused capacity for others. A single-period model with one supplier and two buyers is established to compare the no-transfer and transfer mechanisms. Under information symmetry， the supplier’s reservation price， transfer-sharing ratio， and buyers’ optimal reservation quantities are evaluated. Sensitivity analysis is then conducted to examine how demand probability， reservation price， transfer-sharing ratio， and demand differences affect buyer profit， supplier profit， and total system profit. The model is further extended to an information asymmetry setting with high demand and low-demand buyer types. Numerical results show that the transfer mechanism reallocates unused capacity to the buyer with higher realized demand， thereby reducing idle capacity and shortage losses and improving supplier profit and total system profit. Under information asymmetry， differentiated contract design can guide buyers with different demand types toward appropriate reservation decisions. Overall， capacity reservation contracts， transfer mechanisms， and information asymmetry are integrated into a unified framework for supply chain capacity allocation and contract design under demand uncertainty.
