本研究源自實務觀察：企業於限制員工權利新股（Restricted Stock Awards， RSA）發行過程中，重大訊息公告所揭露之預估費用與後續財務報表實際認列金額之間，可能存在顯著差異。此一「揭露－認列落差」反映企業於給與日認定、公允價值衡量及既得條件估計等面向可能存在之專業判斷與裁量空間。基於此，本研究以 IFRS 2「股份基礎給付」（Share-based Payment）規範為基礎，探討限制員工權利新股之公允價值衡量與會計處理實務，並進一步分析其制度設計與員工留才效果之關聯。 研究樣本為臺灣上市櫃電腦及週邊設備產業八家公司，研究期間涵蓋民國108年至114年6月，橫跨 COVID-19 疫情與人工智慧（AI）需求成長之不同經濟環境。本研究採多重個案分析法，蒐集並比較各公司 RSA 發行條款、既得條件、績效條件及公允價值衡量方式，並納入缺乏市場流通性折價（Discount for Lack of Marketability， DLOM）假設進行分析；同時結合 TEJ 員工流動率資料進行趨勢檢視與交叉驗證，並輔以主管機關函釋作為制度判斷依據。 研究結果顯示，不同企業於 RSA 制度設計與會計處理上存在顯著差異。大型企業多採相對績效評估（Relative Performance Evaluation， RPE），中小型成長企業偏好歷史或階段性指標，穩健型企業則傾向設定盈餘門檻。此外，RSA 留才效果呈現股價敏感性，惟本研究係依個案觀察結果歸納，尚無法建立嚴格因果關係。股價上升期間實施者，其員工流動率多呈現下降或維持低檔；反之，當股價表現不佳時，股權激勵效果可能減弱，留任誘因亦相對下降。惟相關股份基礎給付費用仍須依 IFRS 2 規範於既得期間持續認列。研究亦發現，不同揭露階段之費用資訊可能因給與日認定、估值假設及既得條件調整而產生差異，顯示企業於估值與認列過程中存在一定程度之裁量空間。 本研究之貢獻在於連結 RSA 之會計衡量問題與制度實質效果，揭示企業於公允價值衡量、費用認列及留才機制上的實務差異，並結合主管機關函釋補充制度脈絡。研究結果可提供企業制度設計與資訊揭露之參考，並協助投資人評估 RSA 對股東權益、公司治理及人才留任之影響。;This study is motivated by a practical observation that differences may exist between the estimated expenses disclosed in material information announcements and the actual expenses subsequently recognized in financial statements for Restricted Stock Awards (RSA). This disclosure–recognition gap reflects managerial judgment in grant-date determination， fair value measurement， and vesting estimates. Based on IFRS 2 “Share-based Payment，” this study examines the fair value measurement and accounting treatment of RSA and explores the relationship between RSA plan design and retention-related performance. The sample consists of eight listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan’s computer and peripheral equipment industry. The study period spans from 2019 to June 2025， covering both the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent growth in artificial intelligence (AI) demand. A multiple-case study approach is adopted to compare RSA issuance terms， vesting conditions， performance conditions， and fair value measurement methods across firms. Assumptions related to the Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM)， employee turnover data from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ)， and regulatory interpretations are incorporated into the analysis. The results indicate significant differences in RSA design and accounting practices across firms. Large firms tend to adopt Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE)， while small and medium-sized growth firms prefer historical or stage-based performance indicators. More stable firms tend to establish earnings thresholds. In addition， retention-related performance appears to be sensitive to stock price performance. Firms implementing RSA during periods of rising stock prices generally experience lower or stable employee turnover rates， whereas poor stock performance may weaken retention incentives. However， this finding is based on case observations and trend comparisons; therefore， a strict causal relationship cannot be established. The study also finds that differences in grant-date determination， valuation assumptions， and vesting estimates may lead to variations in expense information disclosed at different stages， indicating the existence of managerial discretion in the valuation and recognition process. This study links accounting measurement issues with the substantive effects of RSA plans and highlights practical differences in fair value measurement， expense recognition， and retention mechanisms across firms. The findings provide useful references for compensation design， disclosure practices， and investor evaluation of the effects of RSA on shareholder equity， corporate governance， and talent retention.
