本研究以 2013 年至 2022 年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討策略一致性是否在 CEO 雙重性與企業財務績效之間扮演中介角色，並進一步檢驗可支配閒置資源對此一間接效果的調節作用。實證結果顯示：CEO 雙重性對企業財務績效雖無顯著直接影響，卻會顯著降低企業的策略一致性；而策略一致性對會計績效(ROA、ROE)具正向影響，對市場績效(Tobin’s Q)則呈負向影響，並在 CEO 雙重性與績效之間扮演中介角色。此外，可支配閒置資源會顯著調節此一中介機制，當企業擁有較高的可支配閒置資源時，CEO 雙重性透過策略一致性影響績效的間接效果隨之增強。 本研究揭示 CEO 權力結構並非直接決定企業財務績效，而是透過策略一致性此一策略形成機制間接發揮作用，且此機制受企業內部資源條件所制約。研究結果有助於解釋過去文獻對 CEO 雙重性與績效關係結論分歧的原因，並可作為企業在設計公司治理結構與制定策略決策機制時的參考依據。;This study examines whether strategic conformity mediates the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance and further investigates the moderating role of discretionary slack resources in this indirect effect. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 2013 to 2022， the empirical results reveal that CEO duality does not have a significant direct effect on firm performance; however， it significantly reduces firms′ level of strategic conformity. Strategic conformity， in turn， has a positive effect on accounting-based performance measures (ROA and ROE) but a negative effect on market-based performance (Tobin’s Q). The findings further indicate that strategic conformity serves as a mediator between CEO duality and firm performance， demonstrating a double-edged effect. In addition， discretionary slack resources significantly moderate this mediation mechanism. Specifically， when firms possess higher levels of discretionary slack resources， the indirect effect of CEO duality on firm performance through strategic conformity becomes stronger. This study suggests that CEO power structure does not directly determine firm performance; rather， its influence is exerted indirectly through the strategic formation mechanism of strategic conformity. Furthermore， this mechanism is contingent upon the firm′s internal resource conditions. The findings contribute to explaining the inconsistent conclusions in prior research regarding the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance， and provide practical implications for firms in designing corporate governance structures and formulating strategic decision-making mechanisms.
