相較於川普政府，拜登時期的印太戰略延續了中國為首要戰略競爭者的定位， 但政策手段由單邊施壓轉向透過聯盟強化與多邊制度建構來達成制衡目標。同時， 美方在特定全球性議題上保留合作空間，避免全面脫鉤。在軍事層面，美國強化在 南海與印太地區的軍事存在，並深化安全夥伴關係以提升嚇阻能力；在經濟層面， 則透過《印太經濟框架》（IPEF）強化供應鏈韌性與區域經濟整合。面對拜登政府 的印太戰略，中國並未採取直接對抗，而是透過台海與南海政策強化區域影響力， 並深化與東協及其他區域國家的經濟與制度連結（如「一帶一路」倡議），以削弱 美國在印太的影響力，進而與美國主導的地緣政治競爭。中國的回應，並非僅止於 對美國政策的反制，而是建立在其對區域秩序與大國競爭的長期戰略之上。;Since the end of the Cold War， U.S.–China relations have undergone a transformation from confrontation to engagement， and then back to strategic rivalry. As China’s comprehensive national power has rapidly grown and its influence in regional and global affairs has continued to expand， the United States’ perception of China has gradually shifted from a potential partner for cooperation to a primary strategic competitor. This shift in role definition has not only profoundly affected the patterns of interaction between the two countries， but has also reshaped the evolution of the global political and economic order.
This paper takes the post–Cold War period as its historical context， focusing on U.S. policy toward China during the Biden administration. Using the Indo-Pacific strategy as the analytical framework， it examines U.S.–China interactions and competition across military， economic， and diplomatic multilateral institutional dimensions from the perspective of strategic rivalry. Drawing on theoretical perspectives such as neorealism and liberalism， this study explains that under conditions of structural power transition， major powers not only compete through military and economic means， but also engage in strategic cooperation and balancing through multilateral institutions and alliance networks. The findings suggest that， amid the intersection of multilateralism and regionalism， the Indo-Pacific has become the central arena of U.S.–China competition， where both sides are engaged in long-term rivalry over institutional norms and regional connectivity. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping， China continues to advance its rise by challenging the institutional legitimacy and international influence of the United States. Meanwhile， the Biden administration emphasizes democratic values， institutional cooperation， and the rebuilding of alliance networks in an effort to sustain U.S. global leadership. This competition has become the dominant pattern of U.S.China relations， representing a long-term and structural strategic contest that will profoundly shape the evolution of the contemporary international order.
Compared with the Trump administration， the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy continues to define China as the primary strategic competitor， but shifts its policy instruments from unilateral pressure to strengthening alliances and constructing multilateral institutions to achieve balancing objectives. At the same time， the United States preserves space for cooperation on specific global issues in order to avoid full decoupling.
At the military level， the United States has reinforced its presence in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific region， while deepening security partnerships to enhance deterrence. Economically， it promotes supply chain resilience and regional economic integration through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). In response to the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy， China has not opted for direct confrontation; instead， it has sought to strengthen its regional influence through policies in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea， while deepening economic and institutional ties with ASEAN and other regional countries (such as through the Belt and Road Initiative). These efforts aim to weaken U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific and to compete with U.S.-led geopolitical strategies. China’s response is not merely reactive to U.S. policy， but is rooted in its long term strategic vision for regional order and great-power competition.
