本文探討政府持股以及內外資持股對企業盈餘管理之影響，旨在釐清不同股東在台灣政商環境下的治理角色。過去文獻對外資的監督多持正面看法，但政府關係係提供「資源挹注」抑或引發「監管寬容」仍有分歧，且內資的監督是否因業務壓力削弱效能亦未有定論。本研究採一階段迴歸模型與 Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) 面板因果檢定，分析 2008 年至 2024 年之最終控制權與財報資料。實證結果顯示，具政府持股背景之企業傾向面臨顯著財務限制，顯示其負面操縱誘因抵銷了潛在資源優勢。進一步分析發現，政府持股因政治庇護效應與盈餘管理呈正相關；而外資持股則顯著抑制盈餘操縱；值得注意的是，內資持股雖能抑制應計操縱，卻導致管理階層轉向實質操縱，存在明顯之「手段替代效應」。綜合而言，本研究證實在特定壓力下會產生操縱路徑之位移機制，對監管機構落實分類監測具有重要參考價值。;This study investigates the impacts of government ownership as well as domestic and foreign institutional ownership on corporate earnings management， aiming to clarify the governance roles played by different types of shareholders within Taiwan′ s political and economic environment. Prior literature generally holds a positive view of the monitoring role of foreign investors. However， controversy persists over whether government relationships provide "resource endowment" or induce "regulatory forbearance，" and conclusions remain mixed regarding whether the monitoring efficacy of domestic investors is undermined by business pressures. Utilizing a one-step regression model and the Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) panel causality test， this study analyzes ultimate control and financial reporting data from 2008 to 2024. The empirical results indicate that firms with government ownership tend to face significant financial constraints， suggesting that their negative manipulation incentives counteract potential resource advantages. Further analysis reveals that government ownership is positively correlated with earnings management due to the political patronage effect， whereas foreign ownership significantly suppresses earnings manipulation. Notably， while domestic ownership restrains accrual-based manipulation， it drives management to shift toward real earnings management， demonstrating a distinct "substitution effect of manipulation methods." Collectively， this study confirms a displacement mechanism of manipulation pathways under specific pressures， offering valuable insights for regulatory authorities implementing classified monitoring.
