本文旨在探究我國公司法上股份有限公司之股東「主動」向公司請求相關資訊的權利，稱「股東查閱權」。股東查閱權乃股東行使提案權、表決權、董事會違法行為制止請求權及提起代表訴訟等各項權利之前提，透過資訊之取得，股東得以評估公司經營狀況並作出適當決策，從而不僅保障個別股東權益，亦有助於監控公司與公司治理。 然而，本文經整理與分析我國學說與實務見解後發現，現行公司法關於股東查閱權之規範存在不足。首先，在直接查閱權方面，公司法第210條所列查閱客體範圍過於狹隘，難以滿足股東實際資訊需求。其次，行使要件中「利害關係」之認定標準未臻明確，導致實務見解分歧。另一方面，股東亦得依公司法第245條聲請法院選派檢查人，以間接方式取得公司資訊。惟該制度設有持股門檻與「必要性」要件，該要件屬不確定之標準且法院審查較嚴格，又存在實務運作下各種窒礙。此外，當公司拒絕提供資訊時，現行制裁機制僅有行政罰鍰，威嚇效果有限，難以確保股東查閱權之實現。 本文透過比較法研究，觀察美國及日本之相關規範，汲取所長以為我國法制提出改革方向。值得注意者係，德拉瓦州普通公司法去年修法傾向限縮股東查閱權，使吾人省思權利過度擴張所可能產生之負面影響。是以，本文期能提出修法建議，以在股東權益保障與維護公司經營間取得適當平衡，透過合理之要件與配套機制，使股東查閱權得以有效發揮其應有功能，並促進我國公司治理之健全發展。;This thesis aims to examine the right of shareholders of a company limited by shares under Taiwan’s Company Act to proactively request corporate information， commonly referred to as “Shareholders′ Inspection Rights.” This right serves as a prerequisite for the exercise of various shareholder rights， including the right to propose resolutions， voting rights， the right to seek injunctions against unlawful acts of directors， and the right to initiate derivative actions. Through access to corporate information， stockholders are able to evaluate the company’s operations and make appropriate decisions. Accordingly， this right not only protects the interests of individual shareholders， but also contributes to corporate monitoring and the development of corporate governance. However， based on a review and analysis of Taiwanese academic literature and judicial practice， this thesis finds that the current legal framework governing shareholders’ inspection rights remains inadequate. First， with respect to direct inspection rights， the scope of accessible information under Article 210 of the Company Act is limited to a narrow list， which may not sufficiently meet shareholders’ practical needs. Second， the requirement of “submitting evidentiary document(s) to show his/her interests involved” lacks clear standards， resulting in inconsistent interpretations in practice. In addition， shareholders may obtain corporate information indirectly by applying to the court for the appointment of an inspector under Article 245 of the Company Act. Nevertheless， this mechanism is subject to a shareholding threshold and a “necessity” requirement. The latter is inherently indeterminate and has been applied with increasing strictness by the courts， giving rise to various practical difficulties. Furthermore， when a company refuses to provide information， the existing enforcement mechanism relies primarily on administrative fines， which appear to have limited deterrent effect and may not effectively ensure the realization of shareholders’ inspection rights. This thesis adopts a comparative approach by examining the relevant legal frameworks in the United States and Japan， with a view to drawing insights for possible reforms in Taiwan. It is noteworthy that recent amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law have tended to restrict shareholders’ inspection rights， prompting reflection on the potential adverse effects of excessive expansion of such rights. In light of the above， this thesis attempts to propose suggestions for legal reform， with the aim of achieving an appropriate balance between the protection of shareholders’ rights and the preservation of corporate operations. Through the design of reasonable requirements and supporting measures， it is expected that the right of inspection may function more effectively and contribute to the sound development of corporate governance in Taiwan.
