我國離婚率逐年升高，2024年粗離婚率達2.28‰，高居亞洲第二。未成年子女與非同住父母之會面交往權行使，長期陷於執行困難之結構性困局：現行強制執行、暫時處分及改定親權等身分法工具程序冗長、救濟緩慢、訴訟成本高昂，且在「子女最佳利益」原則引導下，法院不得不就個案進行耗時之實質調查，難以形成明確、穩定之事前規範框架；而離婚父母在高衝突情境中缺乏互信基礎，使會面交往協議之自願遵守處處受阻，未成年子女被迫承擔親情中斷之苦果。 本文以文獻研究法及功能比較法為研究方法，以美國信託法為唯一比較對象，援引條件信託與激勵型信託之制度發展、公序良俗原則歷經三次信託法重述之歷史演進（從1935年禁止鼓勵離婚條款，至2003年明文確立「家庭互動保護」之政策目標）、境內資產保護信託之子女扶養費例外，以及Geisman、Nepomnyaschy等學者確認探視與扶養費正相關之社會科學實證研究，構建完整之比較法基礎；並援引Hartig及Zhou之共同託管（mutual escrow）實驗研究，作為雙向對稱財務承諾機制之行為科學支撐。本文並引入心理學上「享樂跑步機」（hedonic treadmill）效應，分析金錢誘因隨時間遞減之結構性限制，作為信託條款設計（如給付節奏與條件之安排）之理論修正依據。 在比較法基礎之上，本文提出兩種信託架橋設計。其一為「以違約金約定信託」：由父母雙方各自預先交付財產成立信託，以對稱之財務風險創造相互承諾結構，並以雙方共同簽署之「成功交付子女確認書」作為客觀觸發條件，降低受託人認定困難及雙方違約誘因；其二為「探視激勵信託」，設計類型多元，包括將扶養費、剩餘財產分配等金錢給付之撥付節奏與探視履行相互連結，以及為降低跨縣市或跨國探視財務門檻而設計之費用補貼機制，以財務誘因補強身分法義務之自願遵守。 本文認為，上開設計在我國現行信託法第1條及第5條框架下，無法規範上之根本障礙。惟信託機制存有若干侷限：受託人通常為金融機構，欠缺家事法律專業，其判斷以形式審查為主；且依民法第252條，法院仍保有實質審查違約事由及職權酌減違約金之權限，故信託無法完全取代法院程序。就此而言，信託機制宜定位為訴訟外解決紛爭之補充工具，在創造「先支付、後爭訟」格局之同時，最適合運用於衝突程度中等、雙方尚有一定善意基礎之離婚家庭，而非高度惡意對抗之類型，俾為未成年子女之親情聯繫提供更穩定之制度性保障。;Taiwan′s rising divorce rate—reaching 2.28‰ in 2024， the second highest in Asia—has intensified disputes over visitation rights for minor children and placed parental-relationship continuity at the center of post-divorce conflict. Existing enforcement mechanisms—custody modification， injunctive relief， and compulsory execution—are slow， costly， and require courts to conduct time-consuming individualized assessments under the "best interests of the child" standard， making stable ex ante governance structurally difficult. Post-divorce high-conflict environments further erode the cooperative foundation necessary for voluntary compliance with visitation agreements， leaving minor children to bear the emotional cost of severed parental bonds. This Article employs documentary research and functional comparative analysis， drawing exclusively on American trust law and explaining the institutional rationale for that choice. It surveys the development of conditional and incentive trusts; the evolution of the public policy doctrine through three successive Restatements of Trusts—from the 1935 prohibition on divorce-encouraging terms to the 2003 affirmative recognition of "family interaction" as an independently protected policy value; the child-support exception to domestic asset protection trusts; and empirical social-science evidence—including Geisman′s finding that parents with visitation rights pay child support at an 80% rate compared to 49% for those without—confirming a robust positive correlation between visitation frequency and child-support compliance. The Article also draws on Hartig and Zhou′s 2025 mutual escrow experiment as behavioral-science support for symmetric financial commitment mechanisms. The Article also draws on the psychological concept of the “hedonic treadmill” to analyze the structural attenuation of financial incentives over time， informing the design of disbursement schedules and conditions. Building on this comparative foundation， the Article proposes two trust-based bridge designs. The first， a "penalty clause trust，" requires both parents to deposit assets into separate trusts ex ante， creating a symmetric financial-risk structure that functions as a mutual commitment device to deter breach; a jointly signed "successful child-transfer confirmation" serves as the objective triggering condition， minimizing discretion disputes at the trustee level. The second， a "visitation incentive trust，" encompasses multiple design variants: linking the disbursement schedule of child support， spousal maintenance， or residual marital property distributions to documented visitation performance; and providing cost-subsidy arrangements funded from trust assets to reduce financial barriers for cross-county or cross-border visitation， thereby reinforcing voluntary compliance with family-law duties through targeted financial incentives. The Article concludes that neither design faces a fundamental legal obstacle under Taiwan′s Trust Act (Articles 1 and 5). Limitations are explicitly acknowledged: trustees—typically financial institutions—lack specialized family-law expertise and are confined to document-based， formal review; courts retain substantive authority to determine whether a breach occurred， to evaluate "just cause" defenses， and to reduce agreed penalty amounts under Civil Code Article 252. Trust mechanisms therefore cannot fully replace judicial oversight and are better conceived as a complementary out-of-court dispute-resolution supplement. By creating a "pay first， litigate later" dynamic， these designs are best suited for moderate-conflict divorces where both parties retain some cooperative intent—not for deeply adversarial situations—offering minor children a more stable， institution-backed safeguard for their ongoing parental relationships. The Article closes with recommendations for legislative codification within the Family Case Act to make this framework a standard tool in collaborative divorce planning.
