勞動契約以從屬性為要件，而實務上從屬性又以人格從屬性、經濟上從屬性、組織上從屬性為其內涵，而有續期服務獎金約定之勞務契約是否必然得出具有從屬性之結論，本文整理後，傾向得出肯定之結論，其原因有三： 其一，就續期服務獎金制度而言，續期服務獎金是在保險商品製作時，即已整體考量商品成本與獲利結構，而經保險精算計算得出，以此觀之，保險公司與業務員之間之關係似乎可以單純為，於保險商品招攬於工作完成領取特定給付報酬之承攬關係。續期服務獎金領取總額已經保險精算而無法由後續保險公司再為更動確為屬實。然此忽略保險實務上保險公司對此類獎金領取多設有諸多條件與限制，例如通過考核、達成一定業績，領取數額也會因是否為主管業務員與其主管階級而有所差異，凡此種種皆為保險公司，藉由調控佣金獲取比率以有效管理旗下業務員所設計之佣金制度。 其次，再續期服務獎金領取要件上，現行實務多以繼續服務為其要件。而本文比較其他類型勞務契約發現，不因有「繼續服務」之要件，而必然被定型為特定典型契約，真正影響契約定性者為勞務提供過程中雇主的干預程度。而實務上此類獎金約定通常會以承攬契約形式約定，然實務上多有聯立締結一僱傭契約，而就繼續提供服務之內容與獎金領取方式藉由僱傭契約約定藉此規避勞動契約之認定。因此本文認為在此類情況縱為聯立契約，於契約定性上仍因參酌另一獨立之僱傭契約所提供之勞務內容一併觀察。而觀察實務後發現實務就獎金報酬之領取，多設有如下規定：通過雇主業績考量、是否達成一定業績標準、是否通過雇主所訂之教育訓練等，形式上雖然與勞務提供過程沒有直接關係，但雇主對此的限制將迫使業務員不得不聽從雇主指令，包括接受雇主人力調派、從事與保險招攬無關之行政事務與組織內部活動，因而具備人格從屬性。 其三，就保險業務員管理規則而言，該管理規則課予保險公司一公法上義務，避免業務員為求保險招攬而有害交易秩序與要保人權益，為達成此一管制目的，要求保險公司舉辦教育訓練、要求訂立獎懲辦法等，形成保險公司對保險業務員之嚴密控制，因此該管理規則落實於保險公司與其下業務員之間，無可避免的結果就是加強渠間從屬關係。 而在結論而言，本文之所以對答案僅謂傾向肯定，而非必然，其原因也正如前述三者，就續期服務獎金之制度與要件而言，若保險公司不設立太多與保險招攬無關的領取條件，使報酬領取可以完全繫諸於保險招攬成果，那業務員就不易受雇主保險公司指示干預。就管理規則而言，實務之所以將管理規則採為為渠間勞動契約之認定，原因在於勞動契約與勞務契約之界線在規範上沒有明確分立，根本解決之法應係以專法方式，明確針對不同勞動契約要件、類型、當事人間權利義務關係與當事人間應負有何種公法上義務為詳細之規範，如此才不致發生，將公法上義務，採為私人間權利義務關係認定之模糊空間。;A labor contract is defined by the existence of subordination. In practice， subordination is generally understood to encompass personal subordination， economic subordination， and organizational subordination. The question then arises: does a service contract that includes a provision for renewal service commissions necessarily entail subordination? This study suggests that the answer tends toward the affirmative， for three reasons: First， from the perspective of the renewal service commission system， such commissions are determined at the stage of insurance product design. At that point， the overall cost structure and profit model of the product are taken into account， and the commission is calculated actuarially. From this perspective， the relationship between the insurance company and the agent may appear to be a pure contract for work， in which remuneration is paid upon completion of the task of soliciting insurance policies. It is true that the total amount of renewal service commissions is actuarially determined and cannot be altered thereafter by the insurer. However， this overlooks the reality that， in practice， insurance companies often impose numerous conditions and restrictions on the receipt of such commissions， such as passing performance evaluations， achieving certain sales targets， and variations in commission amounts depending on whether the agent holds a supervisory position and at what managerial level. These mechanisms demonstrate that insurers effectively manage their agents by adjusting commission allocation ratios. Second， with respect to the requirements for receiving renewal-service bonuses， current practice generally requires continued service. However， comparison with other types of service contracts shows that the existence of a “continuing service” requirement does not necessarily determine a contract as a specific nominate contract. The decisive factor in contract classification is the degree of employer interference in the provision of labor. In practice， such bonus arrangements are often formally structured as contracts for services (independent contracting)， yet are frequently concluded alongside a separate employment contract. Matters concerning continued service and bonus payment methods are regulated through the employment contract， thereby circumventing recognition as an employment relationship. Therefore， this article argues that even in cases of combined contracts， contractual classification should still consider the content of labor provided under the separate employment contract as a whole. Third， with respect to the Regulations Governing Insurance Agents， these rules impose public law obligations on insurance companies to prevent agents from engaging in solicitation practices that could harm market order or policyholder interests. To achieve this regulatory objective， insurers are required to provide training programs and establish systems of rewards and disciplinary measures， thereby creating a framework of close supervision over agents. When these regulations are implemented within the relationship between insurers and their agents， the inevitable result is a strengthening of the subordinate relationship between them. In conclusion， this study adopts a position that is inclined toward， but does not assert， a necessary finding of subordination. The reason lies precisely in the three aspects discussed above. With respect to the system and conditions of renewal service commissions， if insurers refrain from imposing excessive conditions unrelated to insurance solicitation and instead link remuneration primarily to the results of solicitation， agents would be less subject to employer direction and control. As for the regulatory framework， the reason courts tend to rely on these regulations in determining the existence of a labor contract is that the boundary between labor contracts and other service contracts is not clearly delineated in the current legal framework. A more fundamental solution would be to enact a specialized statute that clearly defines the elements， types， rights and obligations， and corresponding public law duties associated with different forms of labor contracts. Only through such clarification can the current ambiguity—where public law obligations are used as a basis for determining private law relationships—be effectively resolved.
