本研究係以避免虧損、維持申貸期間正盈餘、符合貸款契約對負債比率要求及流動比率為四個門檻，探討中小企業為跨越貸款門檻之盈餘管理及財務比率操縱行為。 本研究以民國86-91年間，某商業銀行北部地區中小企業授信戶為研究對象，共計取得496家樣本，遍及17個產業。其中藉由信保基金保證取得銀行融資的樣本群共有185家，以擔保品取得融資的樣本則有311家。本文採用David Burgstahler and Illia Dichev（1997）所發展出的綜合橫斷面進行分析，以盈餘分配圖形取代數量模型，檢視台灣中小企業盈餘管理及財務比率操縱行為。 本研究經繪製直方圖與Z 值檢定之實證結果發現：中小企業稅前淨利分配圖確實在門檻附近有不連續現象，亦即中小企業會為了避免虧損從事盈餘管理，以達到門檻的假設，且中小企業會在授信往來期間為保持帳上獲利而持續從事盈餘管理。此外，中小企業對貸款契約是否規定的財務比率也會進行操弄，實證結果發現以信保取得資金的公司在負債比率400%門檻附近發生直方圖密度不連續的現象，而以擔保品取得資金的公司則無此現象。但兩類樣本在負債比率100%之檢定值及圖形均呈現顯著，以信保取得融資之公司之圖形及檢定值均較以擔保品取得資金之公司更為顯著，代表以信保取得資金公司希望能取得較低資金成本。至於借款契約中未限制的流動比率，研究中並未發現管理當局會為美化其償債能力，而操弄流動比率至150%最高門檻的現象。 本研究發現管理當局對於正的稅前淨利最為重視，亦即為避免盈餘虧損而從事盈餘管理的動機是成立的。此外，對於借貸契約是否規定的財務比率也會重視，亦即為符合借貸契約規定而從事財務比率操弄的動機是成立的。因此推論中小企業會積極操弄重要財務比率及盈餘，以達到貸款門檻標準。 This thesis investigates whether Taiwan small and medium enterprises (SMEs) attempt to manipulate earnings or financial to exceed the following the three thresholds when they apply the loan with bank. The three thresholds they concern are: 1) to report positive profits, that is, to avoid losses; to sustain recent performance, in other words, to avoid loss during have the loan contract with bank .2) to meet loan contract, SMEs keep liability ratio within 400%. 3) to get better loan amount , current ratio reach 150%. Without using aggregate accruals , the thesis applies pooled cross-sectional distribution approach to detect earnings management. From studying the density function for earnings in the histograms near each threshold, we expect to observe discrete earnings around the thresholds, if the SMEs attempt to manipulate earnings to meet the thresholds. Using a sample of SMEs in Taiwan from 1997-2002, empirical results show that the SMEs have the incentives to management earnings to avoid loss and manipulate liability ratio to meet loan contract with bank .But no evidence was found that SMEs manipulate current ratio to get better loan amount.
