本文旨在探討公司治理結構是否會影響企業的給予高階主管認股權證之數量，我們利用公司控制股東股權結構變數來解釋高階主管薪酬橫斷面差異。本研究實證結果發現，當控制股東股投票權與現金流量權偏離程度越高時，或者控制股東擁有董事席次比例越高時，或者控制股東擔任監察人時，其高階主管所獲得的認股權證較高；同時，控制股東身份屬於家族控制企業，其高階主管所獲得認股權證數量亦較高。本文結果指出，當公司治理結構不佳的公司，產生較嚴重的權益代理問題，導致較高的高階主管有較多的股票基礎薪酬。此外，我們實證結果亦指出員工認股權證與公司績效呈正向關係。 The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between corporate governance structure and top executive stock option. The core agency problem is between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in Taiwan. We expect that poor mechanics of corporate governance will pay more top executive stock option. The empirical evidence shows that when firms are corporate governance with serious agency problem, their payment of stock option with CEO executive are too more. Meanwhile, we find that Ultimate controlling shareholder with deviation of cash rights to voting rights, larger voting rights, high percentage of directors holding and participated in supervisory committee is pay higher stock-based compensation to top executives. Finally, this study exhibits that family-controlled shareholders are more likely to pat more stock option to CEO. Our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problem and pay greater top executive higher stock-based compensation. Moreover, the firms distributing prior stock bonus generate more current ROE.
