本文探討當公司發佈盈餘警示時，其上下游產業對此消息的市場反應。 我們以美國上市公司為研究對象，研究期間為2006年，共1,190筆盈餘警示新聞。我們發現競爭對手、客戶以及供應商對盈餘警示的結果可分為競爭效果以及傳染效果。當公司發佈好消息時，競爭對手、客戶以及供應商報酬顯著為負，表示競爭效果較為強烈。在壞消息方面，結果顯示傳染效果較為顯著，亦即競爭對手與上下游的超額報酬為負。另外，儘管我們並未找到一致的變數，我們仍發現當警示公司發佈好消息時，其市占率與供應商呈反向關係，符合購買者權力假說。 We examine the wealth effects of earnings warning on rivals, and the warning industry’s supplier and customer industries. This study is based on a sample of 1,190 pre-announcements issued in 2006. Our results indicate distinct industry responses for good news and bad news. In good news disclosures, warning firms generate a dominant competitive (or negative) effect for rivals, suppliers and customers. Bad news disclosures elicit a contagion response (or negative) in returns. In addition, although cross-sectional tests show less consistent results, in good news disclosures, we find suppliers’ returns are negatively associated with warning firm’s market share, which supports buyer power hypothesis.
