本研究探討(1)公平揭露法案對證券分析師股票推薦評等分配是否有所影響，(2)公平揭露法案對於不同類別證券分析師所發布之股票推薦評等分配是否有不同的影響，(3)公平揭露法案實施後，市場投資人對於不同類別證券分析師所發布之股票推薦評等的股價反應是否有所不同。 實證結果顯示，公平揭露法案對於全部分析師股票推薦評等分配有顯著影響。特別是，對獨立研究機構分析師所發布股票推薦評等分配之影響大於對非獨立研究機構分析師股票推薦評等分配之影響。然而，公平揭露法案對非承銷商所屬分析師股票推薦評等分配之影響並未大於對承銷商所屬分析師股票推薦評等分配之影響。另一方面，相較於非獨立研究機構，獨立研究機構所發布之股票推薦評等對股票異常報酬的影響較大。而相較於承銷商所屬之證券分析師，非承銷商所屬之證券分析師所發布股票推薦評等對股票異常報酬的影響較大。 This paper examines the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on analysts’ stock ratings distribution, especially for independent research firms and investment banks. We also investigate the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on analysts’ stock ratings distribution for their underwriting and non-underwriting firms. Besides, we investigate whether the market responds significantly to recommendations issued by independent research firms or unaffiliated analysts after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure. Our results show that the stock ratings distribution of all analysts significantly changes after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure. The impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on stock ratings distribution of independent research firms is significant larger than that of investment banks. However, the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on stock ratings distribution of unaffiliated analysts is not significantly larger than that of affiliated analysts. This paper also posits and shows that the average daily abnormal return to the recommendations issued by independent research firms exceeds those issued by investment banks. On the other hand, the average daily abnormal return to the “strong buy” and “buy” recommendations issued by unaffiliated analysts exceeds those issued by affiliated analysts.
