本論文係著重於由硬體與許多軟體種類所組成的系統產品產業，其在需求面的特性為：消費者的購買決策則與軟體種類的多寡有關。本論文分為三個部份探討廠商的最適訂價決策，其標題分別為 “Technology Innovations and Optimal Pricing for Hardware/Software System Products”, “Two-Part Tariff and Average Cost Pricing: The Case of a Monopolistic Amusement Park in Supplying a Variety of Rides”, 以及 “Optimal Trade Policies for Software Exports”。 第一部份係研究一獨占的系統產品廠商在不對稱訊息下針對軟、硬體之最適銷售與訂價決策，並探討其銷售策略如何因需求面與成本面的技術進步而受影響。當技術進步發生於成本面時，獨占廠商將減少採取硬體與所有種類的軟體一同搭售之單一訂價的可能性。而當技術進步係發生於需求面時，則廠商採取硬體與所有軟體一同搭售之單一訂價的可能性將會提高。 第二部份研究一獨占廠商經營遊樂園的最適訂價決策。結果發現，每一種遊樂設施的訂價是在遊樂設施的平均維護成本之水準，此隱含了當遊客人數趨於無窮大時，則最適訂價為採取一票到底的訂價方式。當遊客對於遊樂設施的種類具有高度的愛好時，獨占廠商將會服務整個市場上所有的消費者。 第三部份則從國際貿易的角度探討在一垂直分割的軟硬體系統產品產業下，軟體出口國的最適出口貿易政策。假設有一國外的獨占硬體廠商，除了生產硬體之外，並利用授權的方式開放其硬體技術給兩個軟體開發國家。這些硬體與軟體均出口到第三國市場。結果顯示，若每一種軟體的固定開發成本充分地低且消費者對於所有種類軟體之喜愛程度非常大時，則最適的出口政策為補貼。反之，若每一種軟體的固定開發成本太大，則最適的出口政策為課稅。 This dissertation focuses on industries of systems products composed of hardware and a variety of software. In this dissertation, I present three essays to address the optimal pricing strategies of a systems product firm. Respectively, the three titles are “Technology Innovations and Optimal Pricing for Hardware/Software System Products”, “Two-Part Tariff and Average Cost Pricing: The Case of a Monopolistic Amusement Park in Supplying a Variety of Rides”, and “Optimal Trade Policies for Software Exports”. In the first essay, we delineate a hardware/software system product monopolist’s pricing problem under incomplete information. Two possible existing types of optimal (variety-outlay) menus will be shown: a fully pooling menu and a hybrid menu. It was found that a technological improvement on the cost side reduces the possibility of the adoption of a fully pooling menu, while a technological improvement on the demand side increases the possibility of the adoption of a fully pooling menu. In the second essay, we analyze the optimal pricing of a monopoly amusement park. We find that the park sets the optimal price per ride at the average cost of keeping an amusement facility operating. This implies that charging only a fixed admission fee is optimal when the population of tourists is very large. Further, the park may optimally decide to serve all customers when customers reveal that they are very pleased in experiencing many varieties of rides. In the third essay, we examine the optimal trade policies of software countries in a vertically-related hardware/software system industry. A foreign hardware monopolist acquires supporting services by licensing its proprietary hardware technology to two third-party software developing countries. All these system products are then exported to a third market. We show that the optimal trade policy of a software exporting country depends on consumers’ preference for variety of software and the cost of software developing. If the developing cost is sufficiently low and the consumers have higher preference for software variety, the government tends to adopt a subsidy. If the developing cost is relatively high, the government will levy a tax on software exporting.
