債務人於財務陷入困境時對債權為清償或提供擔保，依據一般民事法理，係正當且合法之履行債務行為，然而一旦債務人於事後進入破產程序，該等行為將構成偏頗行為(preference)而得被撤銷，顛覆民事實體法對債之關係所為之設計。本文嘗試以經濟分析為開端，探討該制度之正當性基礎，並參考美國聯邦破產法典之相關規定，從比較法之觀點，分析偏頗行為撤銷制度之方方面面。並附帶介紹聯合國「破產法立法指南」，以及現有不同版本的破產法修正提案中關於偏頗行為撤銷權之規定。綜合上述之討論，本文主張偏頗行為撤銷制度之功能應在解決集體行動困境，藉由撤銷偏頗利益，嚇阻債權人分割債務人資產之行為，最後以此觀點為中心，對我國現行的偏頗行為撤銷制度提出修正建議。 On the eve of bankruptcy an insolvent frequently transfers his property to pay or secure an existing creditor. At common law, this 'favoritism' is legitimate. Under the bankruptcy laws, however, once a case is commenced, preferences are vulnerable to the avoiding powers of a bankruptcy trustee. The first part of this article discusses the goals of preference law and assesses the law’s efficiency in achieving those goals. Related U.S. bankruptcy designs and cases will also be presented and analyzed for need of Taiwan’s future system in the concern of preferences. In the end, a new proposal will be presented for the future design of Taiwan’s preference law.
