本文藉由軟錢(soft dollar)文獻探討，解析國外金融業分析師、基金經理人與經紀商之間的利害關係，研究是否間接影響投資人的信託品質。同時檢視台灣因2008年雷曼兄弟投資銀行破產，引發全球海嘯，進而衍生海外結構型商品不當銷售的糾紛，其中牽涉到經紀商向金融機構提供的「通路服務費」(即所謂的「軟錢」)。軟錢在美國證券交易法規(SEC)28(e)的規範流於形式，在台灣的經紀商亦以各種形式提供軟錢。作者以軟錢的優劣點檢視，認為軟錢雖提供了基金經理人額外的受惠管道，但它亦與基金績效呈顯著的正相關，使基金經理人有積極性管理的動機。論文最後探討因損及投資人的利益，國內外之軟錢收受判決案例，建議因有可行的金融法制，避免淪為道德危機，以投資人信託權利、福址為最大考量。This essay first analyzes the literature about soft dollars in order to dissect if the relationship and the stakes between foreign financial analysts, fund managers and brokers indirectly affect the investment quality of the investors. At the same time examine the sale dispute (which involved the commissions the brokers offer to the financial institutions, the so called ‘soft dollar’) derived from improper sales of overseas structured products caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, which trigger the global financial tsunami. The regulation about soft dollar under the US Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)28(e) is mere formality. The brokers in Taiwan provide soft dollar in various forms. Next, examining the advantages and disadvantages of soft dollars has lead to the result that although soft dollar had provided the additional channel for bonus to fund managers, it also showed a positive correlation with the fund performance. Therefore, it gave fund managers a motive towards a more aggressive management. Finally, considering there are domestic and international ruling cases against acceptance of soft dollar for it endangers the investor’s interest, it is highly recommended to have an executable financial legal system with the investors’ rights and welfare in mind and avoid falling into moral crisis.
