康德的超越統覺之當代詮釋; A Contemporary Interpretation of Kant’s Notion of Transcendental Apperception

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題名:	康德的超越統覺之當代詮釋;A Contemporary Interpretation of Kant’s Notion of Transcendental Apperception
作者:	劉詩韻;Shih-Yun Liu
貢獻者:	哲學研究所
關鍵詞:	超越推證;超越統覺;甘史密斯;康德;知識論;純粹理性批判;蓋爾;牟宗三;Norman Kemp Smith;Epistemology;The Critique of Pure Reason;Transcendental deduction;Transcendental Apperception;Paul Guyer;Mou Tzung San;Immanuel Kant
日期:	2006-12-29
上傳時間:	2009-09-22 09:21:14 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學圖書館
摘要:	超越統覺是康德《純粹理性批判》中的一個核心概念，此概念在《純粹理性批判》的論述中佔有重要地位，因此它的意義影響了整個《純粹理性批判》的論證。本文首先藉由分析康德說明超越統覺之意義的主要文獻，也就是主觀推證，並參考牟宗三對此概念的論述而提出一對於超越統覺的詮釋。透過分析主觀推證中的三重綜合理論，我們指出，由於認知對象是經由感性、想像力與知性的層層運作而成，所以我們的認知對象其實是經由綜合統一表象而形成，並且包含著不同的組成，而其中共通於所有認知對象中普遍的、先驗的組成，便是所謂的超越統覺。　　甘史密斯將超越統覺詮釋為形式我，但他認為此概念與康德的內感理論不相容，並且康德也未說明超越統覺與範疇的關係。而他對於超越統覺最主要的批評則是，超越統覺無法作為超越推證的前提，因為超越統覺不是終極的。蓋爾認為將超越統覺詮釋為一種經驗知識，如此可使康德的論證最有說服力，他並且認為康德主張一先驗必然的超越統覺是無法成立的。牟宗三則將超越統覺詮釋為形式我之本質的超越的作用。　　我們依據本文所提出的詮釋，分別回應甘史密斯與蓋爾對於超越統覺所提出的質疑，最後並解讀《純粹理性批判》中與超越統覺相關的文獻，主要是兩版的超越推證與純粹理性底誤推。透過回應甘史密斯與蓋爾的批評，並且能一致的解讀《純粹理性批判》與超越統覺相關的主要文獻，我們認為本文對於超越統覺所提出的詮釋是一相對較佳的詮釋。　　Transcendental apperception is a core notion in the Critique of Pure Reason. It plays an important role in the whole discuss of the Critique of Pure Reason. By analyzing subjective deduction where Kant introduces transcendental apperception, and by referring Mou Tzung San’s exposition, we suggest an interpretation of the meaning of transcendental apperception. In his threefold synthesis, which is the backbone of subjective deduction, Kant reveals that our objects are merely objects of representations. They are products resulted through the synthesis of the sensibility, the imagination and the understanding. What contained as their universal and a priori elements are constituted by understanding and through the transcendental function which is what we called transcendental apperception. 　　For Kemp Smith, transcendental apperception is the formal self. However, he thinks that this notion is not compatible with the theory of inner sense which is another important part of Kant’s theory. Besides, he also accuses Kant not making clear the relationship between the categories and transcendental apperception. He criticizes Kant’s notion and says that transcendental apperception could not serve as the premise of the transcendental deduction, for, it is not the ultimate ground of Kant’s theory. Paul Guyer argues that transcendental apperception as an empirical knowledge could make Kant’s argument stronger. Further, he argues against transcendental apperception as an a priori synthetic knowledge. Mou Tzung San interprets transcendental apperception as transcendental function of the understanding which we adopt as the most appropriate for Kant. 　　According to our interpretation, we could answer criticisms raised by Kemp Smith and Guyer. Towards the end of our thesis, we try to show how this interpretation of transcendental apperception could give a consistent reading of both the objective deduction of the first edition and that of the second edition as well as the relevant passages in the paralogism. By its power in answering the criticisms of Kemp Smith and Guyer and its consistent reading of other passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, we have showed that our interpretation of transcendental apperception is a better one than others.
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