近二十年來，台灣銀行業經營上面臨極大的挑戰，新銀行如雨後春筍般的成立，存放款利差卻從從1992年的2.75%，最低縮減到2009年的1.22%。由於市場的價格與非價格競爭的緣故，讓本國銀行的獲利不斷減少，為了搶業務不惜降低放款授信品質，亞洲金融風暴起全球總體經濟的惡化，國內企業陸續發生了財務危機，讓逾放比在2001年來到最高峰7.48%。銀行的經營就不單只有像一般公司的目標(股東權益極大化)，更肩負著長期穩健經營的社會責任。所以公司治理在幫助銀行穩健經營(逾放比)與獲利上影響力，將是本篇論文討論的重點。 本研究以國內銀行為研究對象，期間橫跨1996年到2011年，又依據銀行性質又將資料分類為以下形式：(1)公開與非公開發行銀行。(2)公營與非公營銀行。(3)金控與非金控子公司銀行。在考慮銀行規模等控制變數下，以公司治理變數為自變數，分別以淨值報酬率及逾放比為應變數。實證發現公司治理對於提升銀行股東的獲利不太有效果，但對銀行減少逾放比的有幫助。其中董監事質押過高，會使董監事讓公司獲利受到傷害，也使董監事讓銀行承受增加的逾放風險。降低席次股份偏離倍數與增加經理人持股來降低逾放比效果較明顯。此外本研究也發現金控子公司銀行方面的金控股權需要再進一步適當的分散，使得控制股東經營不當時，次大股東能可以制衡接管公司。 Taiwan’s banking sector has faced huge challenges over the past 20 years. A flood of new banks have entered the market, interest rate spreads have fallen from 2.75% in 1992 to 1.22% in 2009 and both price and non-price competition have steadily eroded domestic banks’ profits. In the 1990s, banks sacrificed loan credit quality to book new business, and when the finances of domestic companies soured after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, local banks felt the sting, with the sector’s non-performing loan ratio peaking at 7.48% in 2001. Because operating a bank involves more than the singular pursuit of typical corporate goals (such as maximizing shareholder wealth) and requires shouldering the social responsibility of maintaining stable long-term operations, this paper will explore the role corporate governance can play, if any, in helping banks manage non-performing loans and profits in a sustainable way. This study concentrates on the corporate governance practices of domestic banks from 1996 to 2011, and classifies information into the following three categories based on bank type: 1) publicly listed and non-publicly listed banks 2) state-run and non-state-run banks and 3) financial holding company and non-FHC subsidiary banks. Using control variables such as bank size, and treating corporate governance variables as independent variables and return on equity and non-performing loan ratio as dependent variables, this study finds that corporate governance is relatively ineffective in increasing bank shareholder profits but does help reduce NPL ratios. More precisely, when the ratio of pledged shares to shares held by board directors and supervisors is too high, the board is more likely to let profits suffer or allow the bank to shoulder a higher risk of non-performing loans. Reducing the magnitude of divergence between the board’s control rights and voting rights of the controlling shareholder and increasing managers’ shareholdings are clearly effective in reducing the NPL ratio. This study also finds that financial holding companies’ equity in their subsidiary banks needs to be appropriately diluted, so that if controlling shareholders manage the bank poorly, the next largest shareholder can serve as a check and balance or even take control of the company.
