Lazear and Rosen(1981)的競賽理論(tournament theory)提出解釋層級間薪資差距的可能方法，並藉由模型推導證明擴大薪資差距可以激勵員工努力而提升公司績效。根據研究證實，競賽理論存在於各種型式的組織中，然而多數的實證研究忽略了模型中隱含的績效影響效果，並繼而使用不連貫的兩階段模型以驗證薪資差距對公司績效的正向關係。為了檢視薪資差距與公司營運績效的可能內生效果，本研究使用彷彿無相關模型，並以2005至2008年台灣光電業的上市櫃公司為觀察對象，探討高階經理人薪資差距的影響因素以及薪資差距與公司績效間隱藏的內生關係。實證結果顯示公司績效及薪資差距之間具有雙向的正向影響力，而競爭者平均績效、公司規模、內部競爭度及總經理能力變數亦會正向提高薪資差距。反之產業集中度則會負向影響薪資差距的規模水準，說明光電子產業越競爭時，產業中的公司會擴大高階經理人薪資差距以提供工作誘因。 Tournament theory, proposed by Lazear and Rosen(1981), provided strong reasons why salary gaps exist. It also argued that by expanding salary gaps between CEOs and VPs, firms will have a bigger chance to perform better. Many empirical studies have shown their agreements toward the theory, but there are still some rooms for improvements: (1) most empirical studies have ignored the effect of firm performance on top managers’ salary gaps (2) most studies used separate models to evaluate how wage dispersions influence firm performance. In this paper, I use data on photonics industry of listed company and make 2 contributions to tournament theory: (1) using seemingly unrelated regression model to testify the positive circular relationship between firm performance and salary gaps (2) analyzing how top managers’ working contents influence salary gaps. Our empirical results indicate that firm performance has a clear positive influence on top managers’ salary gaps, while the latter positively affect the former in return. Industrial concentration ratio and rival-firms’ performance have impacts on firms’ tournament decisions as well. The more competitive industries are and the better performances made by competitors in the same industry, firms are more likely to stimulate top managers’ efforts and expand differences in top managers’ salary.
