以通路協調觀點探討合約為基礎之靜態及動態封閉式供應鏈管理;Contract-Based Static and Dynamic Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management: A Channel Coordination Perspective

NCU Institutional Repository > 管理學院 > 工業管理研究所 > 研究計畫 > Item 987654321/61886

jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/61886

题名:	以通路協調觀點探討合約為基礎之靜態及動態封閉式供應鏈管理;Contract-Based Static and Dynamic Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management: A Channel Coordination Perspective
作者:	陳振明
贡献者:	國立中央大學工業管理研究所
关键词:	工業工程
日期:	2014-03-10
上传时间:	2014-03-11 09:44:57 (UTC+8)
出版者:	行政院國家科學委員會
摘要:	研究期間：10308~10407;Contract-based static and dynamic closed-loop supply chain management: a channel coordination perspective A closed-loop supply chain consists of the following activities: manufacturing and marketing of brand-new products, using and consumption by consumers, collecting, sorting, and processing of the end-of-used cores, and remanufacturing and remarketing of the like-new remanufactured products. A CLSC is a multi-echelon dual-channel structure with competition or substitution of the two versions of the same products in the market. The stakeholders involved in the system include the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), the third-party independent operators or remanufacturers (i.e., IOs for short), the retailers, the recyclers, the processors, the consumers, and the government administrator (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agent, EPA). Due to the much more complicated structure than a linear supply chain, it provides a fertile ground for model building and analysis. The proposal intends to study the channel coordination issue of the single-period static and multi-period dynamic models by considering a variety of contracts and/or governmental recycling policies. Our analysis will help the CLSC achieve a system-wide optimization through proper strategic choices and decision-making. The system members will be mutually beneficial by capturing the key trade-offs and interactions of the entities in their decision-making procedure. The first part of the proposal (first year) will investigate the static and dynamic problems under the recycling subsidies and the wholesale-price contract. We will use a game-theoretic approach with assumption of the government (EPA) being a Stackelberg leader and the enterprises being followers. The second part of the proposal (second year) will deal with the problem under a more complicated revenue-sharing contract. Emphasis will be placed on the coordination issue among the OEM, the IO, and the processor. We will assume the OEM being a leader and the others being followers. In the third year, we will consider other contractual arrangements including trade-ins, leasing, flexible supply, advanced booking discount, and sell rebates that are prevalent in equipment and consumer goods’ forward channels and some reversed channels. The model building and analysis will be based on practical scenarios. The proposed research contributes to the exiting literature in considering more practical policies and contractual agreements in CLSC research stream. This study will provide profound managerial insights to the government and enterprises, leading to a more environmentally sound and profitable decision-making.
關聯:	財團法人國家實驗研究院科技政策研究與資訊中心
显示于类别:	[工業管理研究所 ] 研究計畫

文件中的档案:

档案	描述	大小	格式	浏览次数
index.html		0Kb	HTML	478	检视/开启

在NCUIR中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

社群 sharing

数据加载中.....