經理人債型報酬積極管理之研究;The Active Management of Debt-Like Compensation

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题名:	經理人債型報酬積極管理之研究;The Active Management of Debt-Like Compensation
作者:	沈信漢
贡献者:	國立中央大學財務金融學系
关键词:	管理科學
日期:	2013-12-01
上传时间:	2014-03-17 14:06:12 (UTC+8)
出版者:	行政院國家科學委員會
摘要:	研究期間：10208~10307;Pension benefits and deferred compensation combined represents a debt obligation owed by the company to the executive and constitutes the so-called “inside debt”, a debt-like component in the executive compensation package. The advocates of the rational use of inside debt suggest that the debt-like compensation aligns the manager’s incentive with debt holders’ and thus reduce the agency cost in debt. The opponents, however, argue that the use of inside debt captures the managerial power rather than optimal contract. In this study we examine whether firms actively manage the amount of inside debt and maintain it near the optimal level. Our evidence will shed light on the underlying motivation of the firms for granting executive compensation in a form of debt.
關聯:	財團法人國家實驗研究院科技政策研究與資訊中心
显示于类别:	[財務金融學系] 研究計畫

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