高階經理人債權薪酬與公司債利差之探討;CEO inside debt and corporate bond yield spreads

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/65382

Title:	高階經理人債權薪酬與公司債利差之探討;CEO inside debt and corporate bond yield spreads
Authors:	張柏堅;Cheung,Po-kin
Contributors:	財務金融學系
Keywords:	公司債;經理人薪酬;債權薪債;corporate bond;CEO compensations;inside debt
Date:	2014-07-30
Issue Date:	2014-10-15 15:29:58 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	本篇論論文以北北美市場 2006 年年至 2011 年年之樣本,探討 CEO 債權性質薪酬之持有對公司債利利差之影響;一般認為在給予 CEO 債權性質薪酬會使其利利害關係趨同於債權人,使 CEO 態度度趨於保守降降低公司風險,因此在 CEO 有較多的債權性質薪酬持有會使其公司債之殖利利率率率下降降,進一步影響公司債的利利差;在本篇論論文的實證研究中所做出的結果,與過去文獻所得出的結果符合,具有債權性質之薪酬對於公司債利利差會造成負向影響的;在分開不不同公司債評等之樣本時,債權性質的薪酬對於信用評等較好的公司債利利差是較沒有效果的;最後再探討這些債權性質薪酬的持有在金金融海嘯的前後是否有造成不不同的影響,結果是在金金融海嘯以後這些債權性質薪酬的持有對公司債利利差更更具有影響。;In this paper, we examined the relation between the holding of the CEO debt- like compensation and bond yield spreads using a sample of the U.S from 2006 to 2011. It is widely recognized that the more debt-like compensation for CEO, the more conservative he is. The interest of the CEO is similar to creditors. Therefore, Creditors are willing to give him a lower yield. The result of this paper mostly consists with the previous assumptions that debt-like compensations have negative effect on bond yield spreads. We also found out debt-like compensations have no effects on safer bond. Finally, we examined the samples of pre-financial tsunami and post-financial tsunami. We found out this effect is significantly stronger after the financial tsunami.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Finance] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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