| 摘要: | 本論文主要探討程明道（名顥，1032-1085）的道德哲學，並將其置於整個宋明儒學發展史的脈絡中，探索其意義。本論文尤其以「應物」觀念為線索，試圖說明程明道如何理解聖人德性，並進一步完成建構儒家玄理之學的思想歷程。
首先，本文略述「應物論」的歷史。「應物」觀念雖然由先秦至魏晉，頻繁地出現在莊子、黃老道家、王弼、郭象等道家學者的論述中。但當北宋儒者回應道家、佛家思想而重新建構儒家傳統時，逐漸注意到「應物」觀念與聖人德性之間的密切關聯性。因而由〈定性書〉一文可見，程明道將「天理論」體系與「應物論」框架結合在一起，賦予儒家義理創造性的詮釋。對此，本文將程明道之詮釋定名為「天理應物論」，並闡明「應物論」在儒家傳統中的轉向過程與關鍵為何。
其次，就「儒家道統論」而言，程明道繼承周濂溪的觀點，特別關注顔回在儒家傳承中的角色。尤其值得注意的是，程明道不是從「歷史圖像」、而是從「思想圖像」的角度重新追尋「顔回學」的思想特質，並藉此區分「顏回學」與「孟子學」、再以「顏回學」涵攝「孟子學」，以求更能相應地彰顯儒家玄學之積極意義。儘管程明道此觀點，後來為朱熹的「道統論」逐漸掩蓋，但到明代，仍重新得到陽明學者的支持與認同。
復次，由於程明道思想主要以《周易》經傳為基礎，故本文從〈艮卦〉切入，探討程明道與程伊川在聖人境界與工夫論上如何發生分歧。筆者認為，程伊川與朱熹都只以「居敬窮理」為主線，詮釋「艮止」所蘊含的道德實踐義。但程明道卻是在「寂感論」、「本體工夫」層次上，闡發對〈艮卦〉的詮釋。由此可以得見，程明道與程伊川之思想，確有不同。
最後，本文探討程明道「孟子學」的特質。由於程伊川與朱熹都以《大學》義理為綱領詮釋《孟子》一書，故頗有「主知主義」色彩，未必符合於《孟子》原義。至於陸象山的「孟子學」，雖然確實遵守孔孟儒學之義理方向，而以「本心」作為道德主體性之核心基礎，但仍只是純粹孟子學而已。故若由此反觀程明道之孟子學，其詮釋一面肯定「道德本心」之超越性與無限性，另一面更追問作為客觀實在的「天道」如何滲透於道德主體，進而為道德主體提供道德實踐的動力。因此，本文最後將進一步從「他者哲學」或「回應他者」之角度，考察程明道「識仁」思想如何結合道德與宗教，完成儒家玄理孟子學之創造性詮釋，並以此凸顯程明道德性思想的特殊意義。
;The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the moral philosophy of Cheng Ming-dao(程明道, 1032-1085) and explore the significance of his theory in Neo-Confucian tradition. In this thesis, I try to explicate his conception of “Response to Things(應物)” with his understanding of Sage and analyses how Cheng constructs with its help his onto-metaphysical conception of Confucianism.
I first give a brief history of the idea of “Response to Things.” This idea appears quite often in the development from Pre-Qin Zhuangzi(莊子), Han to Wei-Jin Taoist philosophies. According to their writings, the virtue of Sage is closely related to his response to all things happening in every situation. In his essay on moral cultivation, Cheng Ming-dao united the concept of Tian-li(天理) with the “Response to Things” and conferred it with a creative Confucian interpretation. I call this a Confucian theory of “Response to Things according to the Way of Heaven(天理應物)”, and I explain the importance of this theory in the turn and development of the Song-Ming Confucian tradition.
Secondly, one of the central doctrines of Neo-Confucianism is an idea about “Transmission of the Way(道統)”. Just like Zhou Lian-xi(周濂溪), Cheng Ming-dao also paid special attention to the roles and status of Confucius’ beloved disciple Yan Hui(顔回). In Cheng’s interpretation, Yan Hui is not merely a historical character, but an incarnation of Confucian moral cultivation. He made a distinction between the Confucian theories of Yan Hui and Mencius and absorbing the latter in terms of the former. However, his interpretation was blurred by Zhu Xi(朱熹) and not until Ming Dynasty when it was revived and supported by Wang Yang-ming(王陽明) and his school.
Thirdly, I argue that the main philosophical concepts of Cheng Ming-dao are based on the insights of The Book of Changes. Both Cheng brothers emphasize but differently the implications of the “Mountain Hexagram(艮卦)” in the achievement of sageness and the theory of self-cultivation. Cheng Yi-chuan, and later Zhu Xi, employ the teaching of The Great Learning in their interpretation, which is basically an intellectual approach, while Cheng Ming-dao’s interpretation is based upon his theories of Response to Things according to the Way of Heaven and moral cultivation of Ti-yong(體用) as oneness.
Finally, I attempt to analyze and differentiate Cheng Ming-dao’s interpretation of Mencius both from Cheng Yi-chuan and Zhu Xi and from Lu Xiang-shan(陸象山). Cheng-Zhu’s interpretation is basically intellectualistic and diverged from Mencius. Lu Xiang-shan follows closely the basic teaching of Mencius in employing his original mind as the core concept, but is somewhat straight forward. Cheng Ming-dao adopts Mencius’ idea of moral mind as transcendental and infinite, but his approach, unlike Lu’s, investigates further how the Way of Heaven implicates objectivity and moral motivation within the subjectivity of the moral mind. I argue that Cheng’s philosophical approach could be understood from the transcendental perspective of “ response to the other”. It shows that Cheng’s interpretation has achieved a special onto-metaphysical understanding of Mencius quite different from Song-Ming Confucians in general. |
