本文主要在探討中國上市公司之公司治理、營運資金管理和公司績效間的關係，並針對2007年中國實施應收帳款質押政策後，對公司治理、營運資金管理和公司績效間關係的影響做進一步的探討。本文以中國A股非金融業上市公司為研究對象，研究期間從2003至2014年，共1,396家公司，計有15,593個觀察值。本文根據文獻探討建立的假說分別為現金轉換週期與公司績效呈負向關係、公司治理對營運資金管理與公司績效之間的關係有調節效果，以及公司治理對營運資金管理與公司績效間的影響之調節效果受到應收帳款質押政策的影響。本文研究結果顯示，現金轉換週期和公司績效呈反向關係，亦即現金轉換週期越短，越能提高公司的營運績效。在公司治理效能方面，本文研究結果顯示，執行長雙重性、董事會規模、獨立董事比例、董事、監事及高管總年薪、高管前三名薪酬總額與第一大股東持股率等變數，對現金轉換週期與和公司績效間的關係都具有顯著調節效果。另外，在應收帳款質押政策實施前後，執行長雙重性、董事會規模與第一大股東持股率都有顯著調節效果，但在獨立董事比例、董事、監事及高管總年薪和高管前三名薪酬總額等變數，只在政策實施後有顯著的調節效果。;This study investigates the effect of Receivables Pledge Policy on the relationship among corporate governance, working capital management and corporate performance for Chinese listed firms. In 2007, China began to implement the new receivables pledge policy, which allows firms to use accounts receivable as security for loans. The sample consists of 1,396 listed firms with 15,593 observations in China for the period from 2003 to 2014. This study attempts to examine the correlation between cash conversion cycle and corporate governance. In addition, it examines the relationship among corporate governance, working capital management and corporate performance. Our empirical results show that the relationship between cash conversion cycle and corporate performance is negatively correlated to each other. All the variables of corporate governance have significant effects on the relation of cash conversion cycle and corporate performance. Finally, we also got similar results after implementing the Receivables Pledge Policy, but only the variables of CEO duality, board of directors and ownership of the largest stockholder have significant effects before implementing the Receivables Pledge Policy.
