| 摘要: | 本論文主要在當代新儒家的論述脈絡下探討新外王的型態與論證問題。20世紀中葉，當代新儒家唐君毅、牟宗三、徐復觀三先生就已經在探討中國文化與民主之間關係的問題，他們都同意新外王不能是過往儒家的德治，而必須實現民主政治。對於儒學與民主之間的證成關係，牟先生有獨特的說法，即「良知自我坎陷」說，他不主張傳統內聖（道德）外王（政治）之間具有直接關係，而主張這兩者是間接的關係。學界一直以來都對如何理解「良知自我坎陷」說有著爭議，其中有康德式的解釋也有黑格爾式的解釋。與學界流行的解釋不同，本論文引入「公共空間」概念解釋牟先生的「良知自我坎陷」說將會是本文的核心課題，並且主張如此理解下的「良知自我坎陷」開出的是一種審議式民主而不是加總式的民主。在處理這課題前，我們必須要解決一些初步的問題，這首先會是「儒學與民主的相容性」問題。因為在傳統內聖外王的架構下，開出的政治型態是德治而不是民主，且民主最早出現在西方文化中，儒學與民主之間的相容性問題將會是儒學要開出民主政治首先碰到的問題。本論文的第二章從一個跨文化的視野回應相容性的問題，主張儒學與民主是相容的。在處理相容性問題之後，本論文在第三章指出孟子的「人皆可以為堯舜」原則蘊含的道德與政治共源性是理解牟先生良知自我坎陷的關鍵：良知自我坎陷並非要在政治上否定道德，道德與政治正當性對儒家而言應是一種共同首出的關係。儒家的道德與政治的關係一方面以「人皆可以為堯舜」原則呈現，作為儒家民主理想的原則，另一方面，審議式民主的四項基本條件（容納性、政治平等、合理性與公共性）剛好滿足了「人皆可以為堯舜」原則的標準，我們可以說儒家開出的新外王就是審議式民主。最後，本論文將牟先生的良知自我坎陷的構想放置在當代西方政治哲學的論述脈絡中，特別是羅爾斯與哈伯瑪斯的論戰中，突顯出牟先生新外王論述的當代意義：倫理分離政治而非道德分離政治。;The aim of this dissertation is to discuss the typology and argumentation of New Politics or external kingliness (xin wai wang) in the context of contemporary New Confucianism. In the middle of 20th century, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fugang already began to discuss the relations between Chinese culture and democracy. They all agreed that New outer kingliness (wai wang) is different from the virtue politics (dezhi) of traditional Confucianism but rather fulfills the requirement of democracy. Regarding the relations between morality and democracy, Mou proposed a concept of self-negation of moral consciousness (liang zhi ziwo kanxian). Unlike the relation of direct linear development between traditional inner sagehood (nei sheng) and outer kingliness, he argued the relation between morality and political legitimacy is indirect. There are many academic debates about how to understand self-negation, including Kantian and Hegelian explanations. Unlike mainstream interpretation, I adopt the concept of public sphere to illustrate Mou’s self-negation and this is the core concern of this dissertation. Introducing public sphere into interpreting Mou’s self-negation, it will conceptually lead to deliberative democracy rather than aggregative democracy. Before dealing with the core concern, I have to discuss the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy first. This is because in the context of traditional inner sagehood and outer kingliness, the outcome of political regime will conceptually lead to virtue politics rather than democracy. Moreover, democracy originates from western culture. Thus, if Confucianism can conceptually lead to democracy, the first question to deal with is the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy. In chapter two, I adopt an intercultural approach to analyze the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy and argue that they are compatible. In chapter three, I extent the Mencian idea of “Everyone can become a Yao or a Shun” as a principle of the co-originality of morality and political legitimacy. This is the key to understand Mou’s self-negation of our moral consciousness. Self-negation does not deny morality. For Confucianism, the relation between morality and political legitimacy is equiprimordial. In other words, contemporary Confucianism shall view morality and political legitimacy as equiprimordial. It differs from traditional Confucianism that views political legitimacy derived directly from morality. This is the principle of Confucian democracy. Furthermore, the meanings of “Everyone can become a Yao or a Shun” can be fulfilled by the four pillars of deliberative democracy, namely inclusiveness, political equality, fairness, and publicity. Thus, I argue that the new outer kingliness of Confucianism can be understood by deliberative democracy. Finally, I put Mou’s self-negation into the context of contemporary western Philosophy debates, especially the debates of the relations between morality and political legitimacy between Rawls and Habermas in order to demonstrate the contemporary meaning of Mou’s self-negation, that is, politics separated from the traditional ethical Five Cardinal Relationships rather than from morality. |
