| 摘要: | 近幾年，高科技產品對於製程方面技術的要求越來高，廠商生產高科技產品面對的挑戰越來越多，成本也越來越高。不僅如此，在高科技產品普遍加工存在高汙染的情況下，越來越多的政府對廠商課徵環境稅。故在迄今生產成本越來越高昂的情況下，廠商們也越來越關注如何去使用更少的資源進行生產，即開始研究節省投入的研發，例如提高製程的良率。因為良率的提高不僅能使廠商減少備料，也能同時減少資源的消耗並減少污染。然而，過去相關的理論文獻卻未針對此議題進行探討。
本論文在不同章節中，依不同的情境考量而建構了不同的模型，藉以討論下游廠商進行節省投入研發的決策與上游廠商的訂價策略之間的互動。在第二章中，本文以上游完全競爭與上游獨占等兩種市場結構進行分析，探究上下游廠商的研發與訂價行為的策略互動策略。在本章中，本文發現了一些有趣的結果，首先，在中間財的定價越高並不一定會使下游廠商的節省投入研發量增加，亦不一定會使產量減少。此外，節省投入的研發效率越高並不一定會使上游廠商的中間財定價降低，反而有可能提高。本文亦發現，上游完全競爭時的下場廠商產量並不一定會比上游獨占時來得高，且上游市場越競爭也不一定會使社會福利提升。
在第三章中，本文考量了下游為雙占廠商的情況，探究下游雙占廠商在合作研發 (cooperative R&D) 與非合作研發 (non-cooperative R&D) 間的研發選擇會如何影響上游廠商的訂價行為。在第三章中，本文發現在下游市場為雙占的情況下，中間財價格提高並不一定會使下游廠商去做更多的節省投入研發，此結果與第一章的情況相仿。此外，本文亦發現合作與非合作研發下的雙占廠商研發量有可能高於或低於社會福利極大下的研發量，合作研發下的研發量亦不一定會小於非合作研發下的研發量。
在第四章中，本文假設上游廠商將在下游廠商做了節省投入研發的投資後才制定其最適的中間財價格，此外，本文亦好奇在下游廠商加工中間財會產生大量汙染情況下，若政府課徵環境稅，會如何影響下游廠商節省投入研發的決策。本文發現，在課徵環境稅的情況下，下游廠商節省投入研發將使下游廠商的產量增加，且下游廠商的節省投入研發行為並不一定會使下游廠商造成的環境污染增加或減少。最後，本文發現了與第一章不同的結果，即下游節省投入研發將有可能使上游的廠商利潤增加。
;In recent years, the firms which produce high-tech products face more and more challenges, and their production cost is also getting higher and higher. Moreover, more and more governments now levy the environmental tax on the firms since the processing of high-tech products usually generates lots of pollutions. Therefore, many firms now pay attention on how to saving their inputs. A saving more inputs is not only reducing its material inventories but also saving the demand for energy and generating less pollutions. However, as per our knowledge, no study has taken this issue into account among R&D theoretical papers.
This paper establishes different model under different consideration in three chapters to analyze the strategic interactions between upstream firms’ pricing strategies and downstream firms’ decision over R&D input saving. Our findings are as follows. In chapter 2, we consider that the upstream market is perfectly competitive or monopoly to investigate this issue. In this chapter, we find that a higher price of the intermediate goods may not induce the downstream firm to undertake more R&D or produce less outputs. In addition, a higher efficiency of R&D may not induce the upstream firm to charge a lower price. Moreover, we find that the upstream market becoming more competitive does not imply that the downstream firm will produce more outputs.
In chapter 3, we further consider that the downstream market is duopoly, and the aims of this chapter is to investigate the upstream firm’s optimal pricing strategies under the R&D strategy of downstream duopolists is cooperative R&D or non-cooperative R&D. In this chapter, we find that a higher price of intermediate goods may not induce downstream firms to conduct R&D. Besides, we also find that the optimal R&D investments under cooperative R&D and non-cooperative R&D may be higher than the first-best allocation’s R&D investment.
In the chapter 4, we reverse the game structure that the upstream firm will determine its price after the downstream firm conduct its R&D for input saving. Moreover, we are also interested in that if the downstream firm processing the intermediate goods will cause pollutions and the government thus levies the environmental tax on it, how the environmental tax affects the downstream firm’s R&D strategy. We find that the downstream firm undertaking R&D will induce the upstream firm to charge a higher price but that may not generate more pollutions under the downstream firm producing more outputs of final goods. Finally, we find a different result comparing with the chapter 1. That is, the downstream firm undertaking R&D may increase the upstream firm’s profit. |
