摘要： This paper deals with an emerging research problem of coordinating a vertically separated channel under a price-dependent revenue-sharing mechanism, which has been used in eBay’s marketplace over two decades. We develop analytic models with bearing the following questions in mind: can the channel conducted by such a mechanism operate effectively and efficiently? Can it outperform the prevalent wholesale-price-only arrangement or the price-independent revenue sharing practice? If not, does it persist in certain decision bias that leads to a lower profit and channel inefficiency? To investigate these questions, we model the decision-making of the two firms in the supply chain as a Stackelberg game and carry out equilibrium analysis. Our analysis shows that the price-dependent R-S model does not outperform the price-independent, and only performs better than the wholesale-price-only mechanism in certain conditions, e.g., a higher retail share of channel-wide cost and/or a lower price-sensitivity coefficient of R-S function. Our findings suggest that it may be unworthy of adopting such a more complicated, price-dependent mechanism from a channel coordination perspective. 其他題名： Cent Eur J Oper Res 出版者： Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag 出版日期： 2012-06-01 出處： Central European journal of operations research, 2012-06, Vol.20 (2), p.299-317 資源來源： ABI/INFORM Collection 版權： Springer-Verlag 2010 版權： COPYRIGHT 2012 Springer 版權： Springer-Verlag 2012 識別號： ISSN: 1435-246X 識別號： EISSN: 1613-9178 識別號： DOI: 10.1007/s10100-010-0182-3
