本篇論論文以北北美市場 2006 年年至 2011 年年之樣本,探討 CEO 債權性質薪酬之 持有對公司債利利差之影響;一般認為在給予 CEO 債權性質薪酬會使其利利害關係 趨同於債權人,使 CEO 態度度趨於保守降降低公司風險,因此在 CEO 有較多的債 權性質薪酬持有會使其公司債之殖利利率率率下降降,進一步影響公司債的利利差;在本 篇論論文的實證研究中所做出的結果,與過去文獻所得出的結果符合,具有債權 性質之薪酬對於公司債利利差會造成負向影響的;在分開不不同公司債評等之樣本 時,債權性質的薪酬對於信用評等較好的公司債利利差是較沒有效果的;最後再 探討這些債權性質薪酬的持有在金金融海嘯的前後是否有造成不不同的影響,結果 是在金金融海嘯以後這些債權性質薪酬的持有對公司債利利差更更具有影響。;In this paper, we examined the relation between the holding of the CEO debt- like compensation and bond yield spreads using a sample of the U.S from 2006 to 2011. It is widely recognized that the more debt-like compensation for CEO, the more conservative he is. The interest of the CEO is similar to creditors. Therefore, Creditors are willing to give him a lower yield. The result of this paper mostly consists with the previous assumptions that debt-like compensations have negative effect on bond yield spreads. We also found out debt-like compensations have no effects on safer bond. Finally, we examined the samples of pre-financial tsunami and post-financial tsunami. We found out this effect is significantly stronger after the financial tsunami.
