人力資源管理學界暨實務工作者虔信厚植人力資本後，組織績效亦將隨之提升，然而，人力資源管理措施通常所費不貲，故組織對人力資本之投資，往往需要企業最高決策單位－「董事會」才能決定。不過人力資源管理措施的支出容易計算、但收入卻甚難衡量，因此在決策資訊不足的情形下，「滿意決」將取代「最佳決」，亦即董事會成員們將尋求共同利益、並共同承擔風險，因此董事會對人力資本投入傾向也將受到複雜的社會權力結構之影響。 然而董事會之相關研究，多見於公司治理學門之中，與人力資源管理跨領域之研究尚屬較少。本研究以公司治理、社會權力基礎以及人力資本等相關理論為本，針對總經理雙元性之公司治理機制，是否透過對人力資本投入傾向影響組織績效、以及股權集中度是否干擾總經理雙元性對人力資本之投入程度，以台灣上市公司為樣本，進行三個期間之縱橫資料迴歸分析之實證研究，以期對跨領域之文獻缺口、以及管理實務有所貢獻。研究結果顯示，總經理雙元性與否對人力資本投入傾向確有不同，而且股權集中度在總經理雙元性、人力資本與組織績效間，形成雙階段干擾效果。;Both theorists and practioners of human resources management believe accumulating human capital can enhance firm performance. However, expenditures of human capital are usually large, and only board directors have the right to make decisions. But since the cost of human capital is easy to calculate but benefit from it is not, decisions could be made of satisfy rather than maximize. Therefore, social power relations of board directors can expected to influence results of these decisions. Researches related to board directors are usually found in school of corporate governance, but little cross-discipline research on human resource management field. This paper then focus on bridging this gap and making contributions both on academic and industry. Using a panel data set of public-listed company in Taiwan, the result shows that CEO duality or not has differenct tendencies on human capital investments and the stock ownership concentration demonstrates dual-stage moderated mediation effects on CEO duality, human capital and firm performance.
