本研究主要架構是以Savaskan et al.（2004）中選取部分通路模式來延伸，旨在建立通路成員為政府、一個製造商、一個零售商與消費者；逆物流通路由零售商負責收集回收（Retailer Collecting）的情境。其中考慮市場上新產品與再製品會彼此競爭產生蠶食效應，以Atasu et al.（2008）利用效用函數推導出正規化的新產品及再製品需求函式；考量回收產品時會有兩種情況產生：（一）消費者自行將產品送回商店，其符合規模經濟條件，採用Savaskan et al.（2004）成本結構來表示；（二）專人到府拆卸回收，其符合規模不經濟條件，採用Atasu et al.（2013）成本結構來表示；其次以Sheu and Chen（2012）中選取加入政府補貼與課稅並行的概念，並依Mitra and Webster（2008）的研究將補貼給予製造商，藉此促進再製造活動並鼓勵製造商設計出更便於再製造的產品；期望藉由建立模型求出通路中新產品與再製品的最佳批發價與售價。;The main framework of this study is to extract Savaskan et al.（2004） to extend the partial channel model. The purpose is to establish channel members, including government, a manufacturer, a retailer and consumer. The reverse logistic is “Retailer Collecting”. Considering new products and remanufacture products will compete with each other to produce cannibalization, choosing Atasu et al.（2008）represents demand function. Products recycling have two situations:（1）Consumer returning the products by himself, choosing Savaskan et al.（2004）to represents the economies of scale cost structure.（2）Retailer helps consumer returning the products, choosing Atasu et al.（2013）to represents the diseconomies of scale cost structure. Followed by Sheu and Chen（2012）and Mitra and Webster（2008）conclusions considered taxes and subsidies and gave subsidies to manufacturer, thereby promoting the remanufacturing activities and encouraging manufacturer to design more convenient for remanufacturing products. Expect to find out the best wholesale price and sale price of new products and remanufacture products in the model.
